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ABSTRACT 
This study was designed to investigate the relationships between executive function, 
impulsivity, and personality within consumer behavior. In particular, this study tested whether 
executive function influences consumer decision making. In order to answer that question, three 
datasets were analyzed. In Study 1A, a dataset was collected of self-report measures (N=6,122) and 
was analyzed to investigate the role of executive function with impulsiveness and personality on 
consumer behavior. In this dataset, a self-report measure for executive function (EFI) was 
employed. In Study 1B., a second data set (N=6,000) of self-report measures was collected and 
analyzed to validate the results from the first data set. In Study 2, behavioral measures of inhibitory 
control, cognitive flexibility, and working memory capacity were subsequently analyzed to identify 
relations with consumer behavior. Additionally, a correlational analysis was conducted on the self-
report measure Executive Function Index (EFI), with cognitive measures previously determined to 
measure cognitive flexibility, working memory, and executive attention in order to identify 
variance overlap with executive functioning. Results for these studies demonstrated that 
components of executive function—particularly inhibitory control and working memory 
capacity—are related to impulsive consumer decision making. Further, these data illuminate the 
relation between a self-report measure of executive function and performance-based assessments. 
It appears that the Executive Function Index may be more closely related to self-reported 
personality than to task-based inhibition, working memory, or cognitive flexibility. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Why do we purchase products? More specifically, when and why do we buy products or 
services on impulse rather than as planned purchases? Scholars in the fields of psychology, 
marketing, and decision sciences have contributed to the consumer behavior literature, enhancing 
our understanding of the question, “Why do we buy products?” Within this research, impulsive 
consumer behavior has emerged as one category within the broader realm of consumer decision 
making. Psychologists have proposed that the cognitive construct of executive function largely 
accounts for impulsive behavior in general. The literature on executive function and its 
components is large and growing rapidly, driven by studies of its role in behavioral issues such 
as: impulsiveness in individuals with attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; 
Barkley, 1997; Brown, 2009); risk-taking by adolescents (Romer, Betancourt, Broadsky, & 
Giannetta, 2009; 2011); violence and aggression (Sequin, Bolerice, Harden, Trembley, & Pihl, 
1991); and substance use (Giancola & Tarter, 1999; Dolan, Bichara, & Nathan, 2008). However, 
less research has been published on the relations between the components of executive function 
and impulsiveness as expressed in consumer behavior.  
This study is designed to investigate these relations between executive function, 
personality, and impulsive consumer behavior. Specifically, this study seeks to identify the 
relationship between individual differences in components of executive function—set-switching 
(cognitive flexibility), executive attention (inhibition), and working memory capacity (updating) 
— with impulsiveness and personality traits (conscientiousness, openness to experience, 
neuroticism, extroversion, and agreeableness) within impulsive consumer purchasing behavior.  
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1.1 Background  
1.1.1 Consumer behavior 
With the rise of the Industrial Revolution, human consumption—specifically a culture of 
consumption—increased among various groups of people in Europe (Jansson-Boyd, 2010). By 
the nineteenth century, academics began to identify the impact of material possessions on 
individuals. James (1890, 1950) discussed how “a man’s Self” was the accumulation of “not only 
his body and psychic powers” but also his “clothes, his house” among relationships and his 
work; he also claimed, “If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant. If they dwindle and die 
away, he feels cast down” (pp. 291-292). The field that subsequently was founded in the mid-
20th century on the foundation of James’s writings was originally referred to as buyer behavior; 
but later became known as the psychology of consumer behavior. Consequently, this field seeks 
to understand the psychology of human consumption. 
Consumer behavior can be defined as how individuals or groups choose, use, and discard 
products, services, experiences, or ideas to satisfy needs or desires (Kuester, 2012). It 
encompasses behaviors and outcomes, including (but certainly not limited to): management of 
personal finances, planned or impulsive purchases, information research of products and 
services, group identification, and risk-taking behaviors. The study of consumer behavior, 
therefore, is the study of the processes involved when people engage in choosing and purchasing 
services, products, experiences, or ideas. The investigation of these processes includes not just 
the moment of exchange, but an entire timeline: pre-purchase planning or non-planning, 
purchase engagement and decision (exchange), and post-purchase (feelings of 
remorse/satisfaction, disposal, and/or influence upon others).  
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During the course of a purchase, an individual must engage in decision making and 
judgment using either affective influence, habitual or automatic response, or a more controlled, 
deliberate approach (Solomon, 2015). These decisions—including automatic, habitual or “snap” 
judgments, or carefully-planned, controlled, rational decisions—ultimately reflect patterns of 
behavior for consumers. Individual differences exist within consumer groups on what types of 
purchases require certain types of decisions. In other words, one individual may make a snap 
decision when purchasing a car because she likes the color red, while another individual requires 
substantial research and deliberation on horsepower and fuel efficiency to arrive at the same 
conclusion to purchase. All of these decisions of consumption are informed by an individual’s 
cognitive ability and personality.  
Of the types of decisions (affective/emotional, habitual/automatic, or controlled/planned) 
consumers make, a pattern of impulsive purchasing can emerge. Marketing researchers have 
published many studies on this type of consumer behavior, typically with the intent to identify 
and predict impulsive buyers’ behavior, thus aiding companies in their marketing strategies. 
Clover (1950) identified impulse purchase behavior as indistinguishable from unplanned 
purchases. Applebaum (1951) proposed impulsive purchasing as the outcome of unplanned 
purchasing plus exposure to an external stimulus. Nesbitt (1959) added to Applebaum’s 
definition of impulsive purchasing by offering the perspective of impulse purchase behavior as 
“intelligent.” He theorized intelligent shoppers took advantage of in-store promotions instead of 
pre-planning their purchases and, in doing so, maximized their purchasing potential. Stern (1962) 
differentiated four types of impulsive purchase behavior: Planned, Pure, Reminder, and 
Suggestion. Within all of these types, exposure to external stimuli was considered an integral 
part of the impulse purchase experience. Rook (1987) subsequently defined impulsive purchase 
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behavior as unexpected purchases unplanned before entering a retail outlet, resulting in rapid 
purchase decision, preceded by a strong urge to possess a product or service, and reflecting the 
consumer’s emotional and cognitive response to a sudden stimulus. Within this definition, Rook 
and Koch (1985) incorporated five specific elements: (a) feeling a “spontaneous desire to act;” 
(b) being in a state of “psychological disequilibrium;” (c) feeling “emotional/psychological 
conflict and struggle;” (d) reduced “cognitive evaluation;” and (e) purchase “without regard for 
outcome or consequence” (p. 23). Rook argued that his definition encompassed impulsive 
purchasing as a more “hedonically complex” experience with emotional conflict and more 
emotional than rational (p. 191).  
Piron (1991) added to Rook’s definition, considering impulsive purchase as an unplanned 
purchase induced by exposure to either an external or internal stimulus that was spontaneous or 
sudden, causing emotional and/or cognitive reactions, and followed by one’s “discounting of 
own responsibility” (p. 513). Piron’s addition to the definition by addressing personal 
responsibility acknowledges the outcome of ongoing consequences to personal finances. 
1.1.2 Executive function  
Goldstein, Naglieri, Princiotto, and Otero (2014) traced the concept of a control 
mechanism back to the case of Phinneas Gage in the 1840s, who experienced an accident 
resulting in damage to his left frontal lobe and subsequent “hyperactivity” and loss of inhibition. 
James (1890) and other scholars discussed cognitive control, or what may be defined in current 
terms as executive function: one’s choice of attending to multiple stimuli or “taking possession 
of the mind” to “withdraw[al] from some things in order to deal effectively with others” (p.403). 
Broadbent (1953) used Cherry’s cocktail party effect (1953) as a foundation to develop his early 
selection model of attention. While not addressing executive function in explicit terms, 
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Broadbent proposed the existence of an attention filter that allows individuals to select some 
stimulus inputs over others. In his early-selection model, he suggested humans process 
information through a sequence of stages, with a filter separating salient information (that which 
is to be attended to and allowed to move to encoding) from other information to be ignored.  
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) proposed the need for control processes to allow individuals 
to attend selectively to stimuli to maintain information in short-term memory storage without 
decay. Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) introduced the concept of controlled and automatic 
processing in which repetition allows a task to be performed with fewer cognitive resources. In 
other words, the task becomes automatic. Automaticity is characterized as uncontrolled, 
effortless, unintentional, and typically occurring outside of awareness. However, Shiffrin and 
Schneider found that some tasks required controlled processing, despite repetition. Furthermore, 
there were individual differences in which tasks and how much repetition was needed for 
automaticity to occur.  
Around the same time, Posner and Snyder (1975), building upon Broadbent’s early filter 
theory of attention, suggested a type of cognitive control that consisted of an executive aspect of 
the attentional system accountable for directing attention on specific or chosen elements of the 
environment. Posner suggested three networks of attention: orienting (sensory input), alerting 
(awareness), and executive control. According to Posner, the executive control resolved conflict. 
In addition, Posner suggested that cognitive control was necessary for an individual to control 
thoughts and emotions (Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2004). Posner’s Cognitive Control model 
proposed not only a component of selective attention but also an element of inhibitory control, as 
he argued cognitive control was also responsible for overriding automatic responses (Posner & 
Snyder, 1975).  
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Baddeley (1986) subsequently developed the idea of a central executive system within 
working memory. His central executive hypothesis proposed an executive feature of cognition 
that oversaw/controlled the slave systems of working memory (phonological loop, visuospatial 
sketchpad, and episodic buffer). This system coordinates how information is used by the slave 
systems by controlling attention designated to tasks engaging information. Baddeley identified 
the executive as critical to selective attention, activation of long-term memory, and switching of 
retrieval plans.  
Norman and Shallice (1980, 1986) proposed a supervisory system that regulates attention 
and can override automatic responses. This supervisory system was part of a dual-system model 
for action selection comprising both bottom-up (contention scheduling) and top-down 
(supervisory system) processes. The contention-scheduling system is responsible for routine 
action, and operates according to habits, priming, and similar associative mechanisms. The 
supervisory system is the overriding system used for novel action. Each action is composed of a 
hierarchy of schemas leading to the proposed action. In the contention-scheduling system, 
schemas are activated from environmental triggering, but schemas may also be activated from 
the supervisory system based on executive constraints and when conscious attention control is 
necessary. In particular, the supervisory system may bias or override the activation of a schema. 
Thus, the supervisory system may inhibit activation of schema in routine action and operate as a 
control system. 
In the subsequent years since the work of Posner, Baddeley, and Norman and Shallice’s 
foundational work in executive function theory, many constructs have fallen under the umbrella 
of executive function, including working memory, attention control, self-monitoring, self-
regulation, initiation, decision making, planning actions, monitoring and metacognition, set-
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switching, inhibitory control, adaptive behavior, and prospective memory. More recent 
definitions of executive function emphasize goal-driven behavior. For example, Barkley (2011) 
defined executive function as “a self-directed set of actions intended to alter a delayed (future) 
outcome” (p.11), and Dawson and Guare (2010) defined executive function similarly by stating, 
“Executive skills allow us to organize our behavior over time and override immediate demands 
in favor of long-term goals” (p.1).  
Most theories of executive function, however, continue to reference Shiffrin and 
Schneider’s (1977) original distinction between automatic (i.e., bottom-up, contention scheduled, 
stimulus driven, routine, or exogenous) and controlled (top-down, goal oriented, non-routine, or 
endogenous) processing. This framework, known as dual-process theory, suggests executive 
functioning involves the modulation of the automatic processes by the controlled processes; it is 
the process engaged to override habit-driven, environmentally induced automatic behavior in 
favor of novel, adaptive, non-habitual but controlled behavior. Dual-process theories of the mind 
have been used within many theories in psychology, including attribution theory (Ulemena, 
Newman & Moskowitz, 1996), theory of personality (Epstein, 1998), and, most applicable to this 
current study, the theory of self-regulation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). 
In addition (and complimentary) to the dual-process framework of executive function, 
Miyake et al. proposed a model known as the Unity/Diversity Model, consisting of three separate 
but correlated factors that comprise executive function. Those factors are mental set-shifting 
(cognitive flexibility), inhibition of pre-potent responses (inhibitory control), and information 
updating and monitoring (working memory capacity; Miyake et al., 2000). Miyake and Friedman 
(2012) argue that individual differences within executive functions exhibit the following: (a) 
both unity and diversity, in that different executive functions can be correlated but separated; (b) 
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substantially genetically informed; (c) related to different clinical and societal behaviors; and (d) 
demonstrate some developmental stability (p. 8). Most recently, Miyake and colleagues (2017) 
have demonstrated evidence that within the Unity/Diversity Model of executive function, 
inhibitory control may not be a discreet component of executive function, rather, it is more a 
common executive function, and both working memory capacity and cognitive flexibility are 
more specific executive function constructs that exist distinctly from the common executive 
function.  
Diamond et al. (2013) have proposed a model of executive function that corresponds to 
and compliments both the Dual-Process and Unity/Diversity Models. From a developmental 
perspective, Diamond traces the lifetime progression of the core executive functions: inhibition 
and cognitive interference control, working memory, and cognitive flexibility. Diamond suggests 
that inhibitory control involves the ability to control not only attention (control at the level of 
perception as well as consciously choosing to ignore specific stimuli opposed to our goals) but 
also interference control (suppressing unwanted thoughts or memories), behavior (self-control in 
the forms of delay gratification, staying on task, delaying pre-potent responses, and “not acting 
impulsively”), thoughts, and/or emotions (p.137).  
For the present study, Miyake and Diamond’s model of the core factors of executive 
function will be applied; thus, behavioral measures for the experimental study in this project will 
reflect validated measures of cognitive flexibility (set-shifting), inhibition/cognitive interference 
control, and working memory capacity (updating/monitoring). Although Miyake and Friedman’s 
model is popular, and Diamond’s model is fairly recent, those models are certainly not the only 
conceptions of the factor structure of this construct. To illustrate this literature, Table 1.1 
summarizes some of the other popular theories of executive function.   
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Table 1.1 Some Influential Models of Executive Function 
 
Theorists Theory Components 
Luria (1966)  Anticipation, Planning, Execution, Self-Monitoring 
 
Norman & Shallice 
(1980) 
Supervisory 
Attentional System 
Supervisory Attention System is the executive monitoring system 
that controls contention scheduling and the activation of thought 
and action schema. 
 
Stuss & Benson 
(1986) 
 Initiation, Planning, Sequencing, Organization, Regulation 
Daigneault, Braun, & 
Whitaker (1992) 
 Six components of pre-frontal or executive functions: planning, 
execution, self-regulation, maintenance, spatiotemporal 
segmentation, and sustained mental productivity. 
 
Denkla (1994) Neuropsychological 
Approach 
Executive function is a set of domain-general control processes 
that contain future tense aspects and should not be viewed as 
hierarchically superior but central to cognitive operations. EF is 
control processes for organization of behavior over time.  
 
Leezak (1995)  Volition (self-awareness and self-monitoring), planning, 
purposive action, effective performance 
 
Borkowski & 
Muthukrishna (1992) 
 
Borkowski & Burke 
(1996) 
Information 
Processing 
Executive Function, as the most important process within a 
metacognition system, is comprised of task analysis, planfulness, 
reflectivity, monitoring, and strategy revision. The three major 
components of executive function are task analysis, strategy 
control, and strategy monitoring. A fourth closely linked with 
strategy selection is strategy revision.  
 
Hayes, Gifford, & 
Ruckstuhl, Jr. (1996) 
Relational Frame 
Theory 
Executive function is the ability to derive, apply, or actually 
follow verbal rules when they are in conflict with other verbal or 
nonverbal sources of behavior. Verbal self-regulation is a key 
component of executive function. 
 
Barkley (1997) Self-Regulatory 
Model 
EF comprises four main functions: working memory for 
inhibitory control, control of inner speech, control of emotional 
response, and reconstitution/behavior analysis. Executive 
Response is a special case of “attending behavior.” Behaviors 
that alter the likelihood of later events and behaviors.  
 
Miyake & Friedman 
(2000) 
Unity and Diversity 
theory 
Three factors of executive function are updating, shifting, and 
inhibition. 
 
Sohlberg & Mateer 
(2001) 
 Initiation and drive, Response Inhibition (stopping behavior), 
Task Persistence (maintaining behavior), organization, 
generative thinking (cognitive flexibility), awareness 
(monitoring) 
 
Miller & Cohen 
(2001) 
 Cognitive control biases sensory signals to promote task 
appropriate response 
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1.1.2.1 Working memory capacity and controlled attention.  Miller, Galanter, and 
Pribram (1960) coined the term “working memory” in Plan and Structure of Behavior when 
discussing the human ability to chunk information using short-term memory while performing 
planning tasks; however, their use of the term differed from current connotations. Baddeley and 
Hitch (1973) proposed the theoretical construct of working memory to address phenomena not 
accounted for by Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968) Modal Model of memory. Specifically, the 
Modal Model of memory proposed three stages of memory: sensory memory, short-term 
Keil & Kaszniak 
(2002) 
 Planning, scheduling, strategy use, rule adherence, generation, 
fluency, initiation, shifting, suppression, concept formation, 
abstract reasoning 
 
Zelazo & Muller 
(2002) 
Cognitive 
Complexity and 
Control 
Functional construct; Executive Function can be understood as 
development of application of rules to problem solving within 
development of children. The components responsible for ability 
to problem solve are problem definition, planning, execution, and 
monitoring abilities.  
 
Pennington (2002) Neuropsychological  Executive Functions are neurocognitive processes, “top-down” 
cognitive control, including working memory and executive 
attention, that facilitate decision making by holding information 
in working memory and maintaining an appropriate problem-
solving set to accomplish a future goal.  
 
Weibe, Espy, & 
Charak (2008) 
 Executive function is a unitary, domain-general process in 
preschool that develops in a sequence of working memory, 
inhibition and then set-switching.  
 
Banich (2009) Cascade of Control Sequential cascade of brain regions to maintain attention sets for 
goal-directed behavior. Activation of one area depends upon 
efficiency of the brain area activated prior.  
 
Latzman & Markon 
(2010) 
 Three factors from factor analysis of D-KEFS labeled Cognitive 
Flexibility, Monitoring, and Inhibition, found in adolescent male 
sample (age 11-16).  
 
Diamond (2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
Friedman & Miyake 
(2017) 
 The core components of executive function are Inhibition 
(resisting temptations or acting impulsively) and Interference 
Control (selective attention and cognitive inhibition), Working 
Memory, and Cognitive Flexibility (adapting quickly to changing 
circumstances and creatively thinking outside the box). 
  
As an adjustment to the Unity/Diversity Model, Executive 
Function is comprised of two distinct factors of Updating 
(WMC) and Shifting (Cognitive Flexibility), with a common EF 
factor supporting (previously Inhibitory Control) them.  
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memory, and long-term memory. Atkinson and Shiffrin proposed that these three memory 
processes are strictly sequential: information must be first acquired through sensory memory and 
processed in short-term memory in order to be encoded into long-term memory. Baddeley and 
Hitch (1974) challenged this proposition with the finding that individuals could perform dual 
tasks simultaneously with minimal performance decrements on either task, suggesting that 
memory could simultaneously store and manipulate information. Baddeley and Hitch used the 
term “working memory” to account for memory processes manipulating information in addition 
to modality-specific short-term storage, defining it as a memory capacity system that “provides 
temporary storage and manipulation of the information necessary for such complex tasks as 
language comprehension, learning, and reasoning” (Baddeley, 1992, p. 556). Baddeley 
subsequently proposed four components of the working memory system: a central executive, 
phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, and the episodic buffer. Most relevant to the present 
study, the central executive system was believed to be a mental faculty that regulates an 
individual’s thoughts to achieve to task goals and controls recall of information from the “slave 
systems” of the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley, 1986, 1996, 2000).  
Cowan (1995, 1999) proposed that rather than existing as a separate structure from long-
term memory, working memory works within the same system. In Cowan’s view, working 
memory is simply the subset of long-term memory that is most active at any moment, rather than 
separate representations within domain-specific storage units as was suggested by Baddeley. 
These activated representations (which could be theoretically limitless in number, although 
Cowan consistently reported the limits to be around four or five items) are retrieved or activated, 
and can be maintained in active, conscious use by strategies (similar to skills suggested by 
Baddeley within his “slave systems”). Cowan argued that if these strategies are not available or 
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useful, or if there are environmental stimuli that threaten to compete for cognitive resources, 
other traces may be activated, and the previously-activated representations become faded and 
lost. Attention control, according to Cowan, could aid in maintaining access to the activated 
memory traces, but could hold a limit of four chunks of information.  
Of the various tasks attributed to the central executive system, the ability to control 
lower-level processes that hold information, even during interference or distraction, would be 
most applicable to this study, and has been identified as one of the more important functions of 
working memory (Engle, 2002; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 
1986). This function is referred to as either working memory capacity or executive attention 
(Engel, 2002) and can be understood as “the ability to control attention to maintain information 
in an active, quickly retrievable state…Working Memory capacity is not directly about memory–
it is about using attention to maintain or suppress information” (Engel, 2002, p. 20). Current 
models of working memory have assumed that the capacity is finite for each individual but that 
individuals differ in this limit (Barrett, Tugade, & Engel, 2004). These individual differences in 
working memory capacity have been implicated in performance on many higher-order cognitive 
abilities, including: reading comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980); listening 
comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1983); vocabulary learning (Daneman & Green, 1986); 
note-taking (Kiewra & Benton, 1988); following directions (Engel, Carullo & Collins, 1991); 
language acquisition (Baddeley, 2003); language comprehension (King & Just, 1991); reasoning 
(Barrouillet, 1996); non-verbal problem solving (Logie, Gilhooly, & Wynn, 1994); law 
enforcement decision making in shooting behavior (Kleider, Parrott, & King, 2009); and 
memory distortion component in hindsight bias (Calvillo, 2012). These differences have also 
been found to be a strong predictor for fluid intelligence and executive functioning (Engle et al., 
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1999); although most recently, Engle et al. have proposed inhibitory control (executive attention) 
reflects fluid intelligence and working memory capacity reflects maintenance of information. 
(Engle et al., 2018).  
Barratt, Tugade, and Engle (2004) discussed the role of attention control within the dual-
process model and described individual differences in working memory capacity as the source of 
goal-directed attention. Barratt et al. suggest that working memory capacity is the capability to 
hold information in an active state while concurrently engaging in planful search of memory and 
retrieval of pertinent task-relevant information. Therefore, individual differences in working 
memory capacity can account for the variations in the ability to control or override automatic 
working memory capacity; controlled attention compliments Posner’s theory of cognitive control 
as an executive attention control, affecting both selective attention and inhibitory control of 
attention.  
Most recently, Engel (2018) has updated his original interpretation of results regarding 
the relationship between working memory capacity and fluid intelligence. Currently, Engel 
suggests working memory capacity reflects ability to maintain information, and fluid intelligence 
reflects the ability to disregard or disengage irrelevant information. Both of these abilities rely 
heavily on an individual’s ability to control attention, and this common dependence on attention 
control is what led to conflation of working memory capacity and fluid intelligence in previous 
studies. Engel’s updated model is complimentary to Miyake’s Unity/Diversity model in that 
inhibitory control (or as he now refers as common executive function) combined with the other 
distinct and specific executive functions underlies all complex executive functions (i.e., 
planning). Both Engel and Miyake are claiming attention control is a common factor in working 
memory, fluid intelligence and executive function constructs.  
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1.1.3.1 Working memory capacity and self-regulatory behavior. Within the context of 
Norman and Shallice’s (1986) dual-process model of executive functioning, Barratt et al. (2004) 
considered contributions of working memory capacity to self-regulation and posited three 
potential mechanisms through which individual differences in controlled attention may manifest 
in variations of self-control. First, working memory capacity (attention control) appears to be 
related to tolerance of ambiguity, such that individuals with lower capacity might be unable to 
tolerate uncertainty of future events and, thus, may impulsively make a poor decision to end the 
uncertainty rather than evaluate multiple possible outcomes (pp .21-22). In other words, an 
individual with lower working memory capacity may, when given multiple options, make a 
quick (or impulsive) decision without adequately assessing all possible choices because of an 
inability to tolerate uncertainty. Barratt et al. (2001) speculate that the cognitive load placed upon 
one by the experience of uncertainty would be costly to an individual with low working memory 
capacity; in fact, the experience could impede the individual from correctly evaluating the value 
of future choice. One possible application of this mechanism to consumer behavior may be the 
ability to evaluate short-term versus long-term reward of purchases. Additionally, set-switching 
or cognitive flexibility (one of the core EF components proposed by both Miyake and Diamond) 
could account for the ability (or inability) to evaluate successfully two options (short-term and 
long-term rewards), as an individual who struggles with flexibility may find switching between 
two types of rewards difficult.  
In the second mechanism discussed by Barratt et al. (2004), working memory capacity 
assists an individual’s ability to resist attentional capture, allowing attention to be sustained via 
executive, goal-oriented control to the appropriate stimuli rather than to salient distractors. In a 
consumer-behavior context, these potent distractor stimuli might include advertising strategies 
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aimed at consumers. Considering most definitions of impulsive consumer behavior indicate a 
component of exposure to stimuli, this mechanism discussed by Barratt et al. (2004) may account 
for a large part of self-control issues within impulsive purchasing.  
Third, Barratt et al. (2004) suggested that working memory capacity may influence the 
ability to override or suppress classically-conditioned affective associations that are no longer 
efficient, optimal, or appropriate—at least at that moment. Marketing professionals certainly 
recognize the value of classical and operant conditioning in purchasing decisions and so select 
colors for packaging, images for advertising, celebrities for endorsement, and so forth to increase 
motivation and build purchasing habits, both of which would require effortful processing to 
inhibit (DiClemente & Hantula, 2003; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Gorn, 1982; 
McSweeney & Bierely, 1984). 
Several studies have suggested that deficits in the executive control system or central 
executive system of working memory can at least partially account for the cognitive deficits and 
self-regulatory problems in highly-impulsive individuals (e.g., Finn, Justus, Mazas, & Steinmetz, 
1999; Stanford, Greve, & Gerstle, 1997; Villemarette-Pittman, Stanford, & Greve, 2003). 
However, the definitions of executive control differed among these studies, as different measures 
of executive attention/control were used. For example, Finn and collaborators (1999) used the 
Digit Span Task of the Weschler Adult Intelligence Test, Revised (WAIS-R; Weschler, 1981) 
and Conditional Associations Task (CAT; Petrides, 1981). In comparison, Stanford and 
collaborators operationalized executive control as Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 
Challun, Talley, Kay & Curtis, 1993), design fluency test (Jones, Gottman, & Milner, 1977), and 
Trail Making Test (Reitan, 1958).  
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In testing a theory that working memory and conditional associative learning modulate 
behavioral inhibition, Finn et al. (1999) used a Go/No-Task with a contingency reversal (adapted 
from Newman & Kosson, 1986). The task involved serial representation on a computer screen 
(750ms) of eight different two-digit numerical stimuli (four no/go and four go). After the tenth 
block, contingency reversal took place; i.e., the stimuli that were previously “go” became 
“no/go” and vice versa. Finn et. al. (1999) demonstrated that individuals with low working 
memory capacity (digits backward of Digit Span Task) and low conditional associative learning 
(Conditional Associations Task) exhibited more errors of commission after contingency reversal 
(a measure of impulsivity) and predicted success of learning to inhibit behavior after contingency 
reversal. Furthermore, they found that individuals with low WMC were more susceptible to the 
effects of alcohol on increasing impulsive behavior, as measured with the Go/No-Go task.  
In order to parcel specific factors of executive control related to impulsiveness, Witney, 
Jameson, and Hinson (2004) predicted impulsiveness (as measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale; BIS-11), from various different measures of executive control, including a new measure 
of memory scanning. The results of their work demonstrated that significant amounts of variance 
in impulsiveness can be accounted for by individual differences in central executive control. 
Further, and more important, a global measure for either executive control or impulsiveness may 
not adequately convey the complicated relation between the two constructs, as the authors found 
that the subtypes of impulsivity are related to different subtypes or component factors of 
executive control. The three subtypes or subscales of impulsivity identified within the BIS are 
the following: Attentional (“I concentrate easily” or “I don’t ‘pay attention’”), Non-Planning (“I 
plan trips well ahead of time” or “I act on the spur of the moment”), and Motor (“I am restless in 
a movie theater” or “I squirm at plays or lectures”). Overall, working memory capacity and 
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cognitive inhibition (deleting or ignoring irrelevant information) significantly predicted overall 
impulsiveness. However, higher scores on the attentional impulsiveness subscale were associated 
with the inability to delete irrelevant or no-longer-relevant information, but attentional 
impulsiveness was not related to working memory capacity. In addition, non-planning 
impulsiveness was predicted by working memory capacity but showed no significant relation to 
inhibition of interference. Finally, higher scores on the motor impulsivity subscale were 
associated with lower overall capacity and a greater ability to inhibit interference.  
Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, and Schmitt (2008) tested the relation of working 
memory capacity (using a computation span task) on self-regulatory behavior, operationalized as 
sexual interest behavior, consumption of tempting food, and expression of anger. Summarizing 
the previous literature (Carver, 2005; Hofmann, Rauch & Gawronski, 2007; Strack & Deutsch, 
2004), Hoffman et al. (2008) argued that self-regulatory behavior was ultimately the product of a 
conflict between automatic and controlled processing systems. Consequently, they reasoned that 
individuals with greater working memory capacity should have greater resources to devote to the 
controlled system, allowing for more successful self-regulatory behavior. The authors 
demonstrated that the relation between working memory capacity and self-regulatory behavior 
was more complex than a direct correlation; rather, they argued that working memory capacity 
moderates the relation between automatic (i.e., temptations, urges, arousal, impulses) and 
controlled (i.e., goals, implementation intentions, incentive) precursors and behavior, suggesting 
higher working memory capacity allows for more capacity to hold long-term goals and shield 
those goals from interference, particularly from automatic processing (i.e., impulses).  
Hinson, Jameson, and Witney (2003) suggested a reinterpretation of findings such as 
these. They argued that the effects of working memory capacity on decision making were 
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reflective of problems in evaluating reward magnitude and, I propose, perhaps future 
consequences. In situations where cognitive demands are high, or in which individuals have 
deficits in working memory capacity, an immediately-available reward may be overvalued 
relative to a delayed reward because the individual lacks the resources to properly evaluate the 
displayed reward. Thus, a behavior that appears impulsive (select the smaller-sooner reward 
rather than the larger-later) may, in fact, be a reasonable decision based on distorted evaluations 
of reward magnitudes (the immediate reward is overvalued, and/or the delayed reward is 
undervalued). Referencing the Delay-Discounting (DD) paradigm, Hinson et. al. (2003) 
suggested that, in situations where either high cognitive load is present or where an individual 
has deficits in working memory capacity, an immediately-available reward might be overvalued 
because the individual cannot evaluate a delayed reward properly due to limited available 
cognitive resources. As working memory capacity is utilized in a large variety of contexts, the 
impulsive decision strategy may appear as a personality trait, identified by standardized 
measures of impulsivity like the BIS-11 (Barratt, 1994). Supporting this interpretation, Hinson 
et. al. (2003) demonstrated that Delay-Discounting performance is related to working memory 
capacity. When manipulating cognitive load, an increase in load predicted increases in impulsive 
decisions in delay discounting (choice of immediate reward over delayed reward), and individual 
differences in BIS-11 and self-report dysexecutive questionnaires were also strongly related to 
delay-discounting performance.  
Reimers, Maylor, Stewart and Chater (2009) reported associations between delay 
discounting and real-world impulsive behavior. Using single delay-discounting choice and self-
report measures of a large sample (N=42,863), Reimers and collaborators reported correlations 
between smaller-sooner choice in delay discounting and several impulsive behaviors: initial 
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sexual activity, recent relationship infidelity, smoking, and higher body mass index. Associations 
between smaller-sooner choice and demographic variables (younger age, lower income, and 
lower education) were also found. Their results suggest an underlying cognitive reason (like low 
working memory capacity) for performance on delay discounting carries into real-world 
decisions and behavior.  
1.1.3.2 Measuring executive function. Spinella (2005a) developed an instrument for self-
rating of executive function within normal populations, called the Executive Function Index 
(EFI). The EFI consists of five subscales (five components determined through factor analysis to 
account for the majority of variance): motivational drive, strategic planning, organization, 
impulse control, and empathy. It was created as an efficient means to gather data from large 
samples for testing hypotheses regarding prefrontal systems and behavior as well as to bolster 
findings with behavioral tests and functional neuroimaging. The EFI was found to correlate with 
other self-reported executive functioning measures, including the Frontal Systems Behavior 
Scale (FrSBe), Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS), and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; 
Spinella, 2005). Although the EFI may correlate with other self-report measures (FrSBE, BIS, 
and IRI) that have been validated, the EFI has not, to this author’s knowledge, been tested for 
correlation with behavioral measures of executive function (Carvallho, Ready, Malloy, Grace, 
2103; Fernandez, Duffey, Kramp, 2009; Gillet, Mela, Studer, 2013; Neimeier, Perrin, Holcomb, 
Nerssessova, & Rolston, 2013; Stanford, Mathias, Dougherty, Lake, Anderson, & Patton, 2009; 
Siu & Sheck, 2005). However, Spinella (2005) contends that the EFI strongly correlates with 
other self-report executive function measures that have been validated through either clinical, 
experimental, or neuroimaging studies. If, as is proposed in this study, aspects of executive 
function—specifically cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, and working memory capacity—
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affect or moderate an individual’s purchasing behavior, it must be confirmed that the EFI 
successfully measures those aspects. To implement the EFI successfully as a measure in a larger 
survey for modeling consumer behavior, a study should demonstrate and validate which 
behavioral measures of executive function are accounted for with the EFI.  
Since the development of the EFI, the measure has been used in at least three studies. 
O’Wain and Spinella (2007) found consistent positive correlations between moral attitudes and 
all subscales within the EFI, independent of demographics, as well as small positive correlations 
between traditional religious beliefs, empathy, and impulse control. In addition, measures of 
gratitude and satisfaction were found to be positively correlated with EFI results, while impulse 
control and forgiveness were negatively correlated within college students (Miley & Spinella, 
2006). More recently, Rabin, Fogel and Nutter-Upham (2010) found the EFI significantly 
predicted, in addition to age and lower conscientiousness, academic procrastination within 
college students.  
1.1.3 Personality 
1.1.3.1 Measures of impulsivity: Eysenck Personality Inventory and Questionnaire. 
References to impulsivity within individuals can be first attributed to Plato, who wrote, “Quick 
intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and 
...persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous are not so 
constituted by nature as to live in an orderly and peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any 
way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them” (Plato, c. 503, p. ). Hippocrates 
(ca. 460 BC-370 BC) discussed impulsivity as a phenomenon of temperament, and Galen (AD 
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129-ca. AD 200) followed within his theory of personality based on four bodily fluids. Impulsive 
nature was considered an aspect of the Choleric personality type.  
It was Eysenck’s (1947) theory that first introduced the construct of impulsiveness to 
modern psychology within the individual differences framework. In the Eysenck Personality 
Inventory (EPI), Eysenck first proposed the construct of impulsivity as one trait (or theoretical 
construct comprising statistically-related habitual responses) of several that explained 
extraversion (Moeller, 2012). Impulsivity comprised of four habits, the first being “impulsivity 
narrow,” which is similar to motor impulsiveness (Stanford & Patton, 2012) and can be defined 
as responding rapidly without adequate evaluation of the situational context or outcomes 
(Hamilton et. al., 2015). Eysenck identified three additional habits: non-planning (acting without 
prior planning), liveliness (motor impulsivity), and risk-taking. However, when psychoticism 
was included as a personality trait in the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; 1975), the 
factor “impulsivity narrow” loaded on psychoticism rather than extroversion, while the other 
three (non-planning, liveliness, and risk-taking) loaded on extroversion (Action, 2003; Whiteside 
& Lynam, 2001). Thus, Eysenck moved the term impulsiveness to psychoticism and organized 
the other factors under “venturesomeness” within extroversion. This movement of impulsivity as 
a component of psychoticism rather than extroversion reflected a difference in approach from 
individual differences to more clinical perspectives, specifically suggesting impulsiveness as 
dysfunctional (Moeller, 2012).  
1.1.3.2 Measures of impulsivity: Barratt Impulsivity Scale. Barratt (1959) made a 
significant contribution to the study of impulsiveness when he created a measure of 
impulsiveness known as the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). Barratt hypothesized that the two 
constructs of anxiety and impulsiveness were orthogonal and created the first version of the BIS 
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with a goal of eliminating items that correlated with measures of anxiety (Stanford et al., 2009). 
In later versions of the BIS (Patton & Stanford, 1995; Stanford et al., 2009; Steinberg, Sharp, 
Stanford, & Tharp, 2013), Barratt suggested impulsivity as a multidimensional construct defined 
as the following: “a predisposition toward rapid, unplanned reactions to internal or external 
stimuli without regard to the negative consequences of these reactions to the impulsive 
individual or to others” (Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001, p. 1784).  
Over 40 years, Barratt created and refined the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale to the current 
eleventh version (BIS-11), which has become the most widely-administered self-report measure 
of impulsiveness in both research and clinical settings (Stanford et al., 2009). The current version 
contains three subscales: non-planning impulsivity, attentional impulsivity, and motor 
impulsivity. This version has been cited over 3,700 times as of 2016. Within these many 
citations, the BIS-11 has been used to identify high levels of impulsiveness in adults related to 
cocaine dependency (Lane, Moeller, Steinberg, Buzby, & Kosten, 2007) and Ecstasy abuse 
(Bond, Verheyden, Wingrove, & Curran, 2004). Studies have identified a relationship between 
mood disorders and high scores on the BIS-11 (Peluso, Hatch, Glahn, Monkul, Sanches, & Najt, 
2007). High levels of impulsiveness on the BIS-11 have also been found for individuals 
diagnosed with ADHD (Malloy-Diniz, Fuentes, Leite, Correa, & Bechara, 2007) as well as for 
pathological gamblers (Rodriguez-Jimenez, Jimenez-Arriero, Ponce, Monsor, & Jimenez, 2006), 
and has been correlated with tobacco use (Spinella, 2002b). In addition, BIS-11 scores have been 
related to right frontal white matter structure in schizophrenic patients (Hoptman, Volavka, 
Johnson, Weiss, Bilder, & Lim, 2002).  
 More specific to the topic of the present study, the BIS-11 has contributed significantly 
to the individual differences perspective on impulsive behavior. The three subtraits of the current 
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BIS-11 are defined as follows: motor impulsiveness is acting without thinking, non-planning 
impulsiveness involves a lack of forethought, and attentional impulsiveness is an inability to 
focus attention or to concentrate (Barratt, 1985). Within normal populations, high levels of 
impulsiveness measured on the BIS-11 have been associated with reduced behavioral inhibition 
(Potts, George, Martin, & Barratt, 2005) and increased sensitivity to reward (Martin & Potts, 
2004). In addition, Levine, Waite, and Bowman (2007) found BIS-11 scores to be significantly 
correlated with academic distractibility. 
Coutlee, Politzer, Hoyle, and Huettel (2014) updated the BIS-11 by using factor analysis 
to eliminate 17 items of the BIS-11 that measured impulsiveness poorly and that did not reflect 
behaviors applicable to modern culture. The updated version, Abbreviated Impulsiveness Scale 
(ABIS), was found to be efficient and consistent at measuring aspects of impulsiveness with just 
13 items, while maintaining the three subscales refined in BIS-11 (attentional, motor, and 
nonplanning). In additional testing by Coutlee et al. (2014), the ABIS was successful at  
predicting alcohol consumption. 
 
1.1.3.3 Measures of impulsivity: Cognitive tasks. Halperin, Newcorn, Sharma, Healey, 
Wolf, and Pascualvaca (1990) argued that differences in performance (specifically, commission 
errors) on a continuous performance task (CPT) to measure vigilance between diagnosed ADHD 
children and control could aid in understanding the role of impulsiveness in ADHD populations. 
Studies have subsequently confirmed the pattern, with more commission errors in CPT among 
adults with substance abuse (Moeller et. al., 2005), adults with bipolar disorder (Swann, 
Pazzaglia, Nicholls, Dougherty, & Moeller; 2003), and children with conduct disorders 
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(Dougherty, Marsh, & Mathias, 2002)—in each case, clinical groups known to exhibit impulsive 
behavior.  
Logan, Schachar, and Tannock (1997) proposed the behavioral measure of a Go/Stop task 
as means to identify and define impulsivity, arguing that impulsive individuals would have 
difficulties inhibiting prepotent responses. Subsequently, Pliszka, Borcherding, Spratley, Leon, 
and Irick (1997) demonstrated impaired performance on Go/Stop task in children diagnosed with 
ADHD, a population known to exhibit impulsivity. In more recent years, a variation of Go/Stop 
task, known as Go/No-Go task, has been used as a behavioral measure of impulsivity (Helmers, 
Young, & Pihl, 1995) and assesses the ability of an individual to inhibit responding to a stimulus 
previously associated with either a reward or punishment. Iaboni, Douglas, and Baker (1995) 
found children diagnosed with ADHD not only to make more errors of commission, but also 
more errors of omission on trials of stimuli previously paired with reward. While investigating 
the relationship between executive control function and interpersonal aggressive behavior, 
Hoaken, Shaughnessy, and Pihl (2003) used a Go/No-Go discrimination task to measure 
impulsiveness in individuals. They concluded that individuals with low executive control were 
more likely to show higher levels of impulsivity (as measured by errors of commission in 
Go/No-Go) and were more aggressive, as measured by Taylor Aggression Paradigm (TAP; 
Taylor, 1967).  
1.1.3.4 Impulsivity and executive function. Chesung, Mitsis, and Halperin (2004) 
demonstrated BIS-11 scores to be associated with cognitive flexibility and intelligence, as 
measured by the Wisconsin Card Sort Test and WAIS-11. That same year, Witney, Jameson, and 
Hinson (2004) reported that subtypes of impulsivity were related to the executive control of 
working memory. The ability to control attention has also been identified as an important factor 
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in an individual’s ability to delay gratification (Peake, Hebl, & Mischel, 2002; Rodriquez, 
Mischel, & Shoda, 1989), and, as described in the section above on working memory capacity, 
low ability in executive attention is associated with a larger impact of impulsiveness on self-
regulatory behavior (Hofmann et al., 2008).  
In an effort to infer the neurobehavioral correlates of impulsivity, Spinella (2004) tested 
relationships between impulsivity (BIS-11) and behavioral measures that have been previously 
associated with prefrontal function (e.g., Go/No-Go, antisaccade, and delayed alternation). The 
results indicated significant correlations between Go/No-Go and antisaccade performance with 
impulsivity (BIS-11) and a negative correlation between delayed alternation DAL (correct 
responses) and impulsiveness. Spinella argued that because the behavioral measures used in this 
study have previously demonstrated sensitivity to prefrontal function, these findings suggest a 
role of the prefrontal cortex and associated subcortical structures in impulsivity, thus offering 
additional validation of the BIS-11. 
As discussed earlier, Spinella (2005) also used the EFI subscales to identify specific 
aspects of executive function related to impulsiveness. He found that the Strategic Planning 
Subscale significantly correlated (negatively) with the BIS-11 Non-planning Impulsiveness 
subscale. Furthermore, EFI’s Impulse Control subscale, which reflects self-inhibition, negatively 
correlated with the BIS-11 Motor Impulsiveness subscale.  
1.1.3.5 Big-five personality model. The Five-Factor Model of personality is arguably the 
most comprehensive personality trait model currently used in psychological research (MacRae & 
Costa, 1987). Goldberg (1993) recounted the history of development of the Five-Factor Model, 
starting with Galton’s (1884) “lexicon hypothesis,” leading to the development of the Thurstone 
Temperament Schedule (Thurstone, 1953), which identified seven factors of personality. Tupes 
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and Christal (1958, 1961) analyzed results from studies using Cattell’s (1943) 35 bipolar 
variables and identified five factors. They are credited with first introducing what is now known 
as the “Big 5” model of personality. As described by Goldberg (1993), these five broad factors 
should be viewed in a hierarchical model in which hundreds of personality traits are organized 
under the five domains. Factor One (Extraversion/Introversion) is characterized by talkativeness, 
assertiveness, or silence, passivity, and reserve. Factor Two (Neuroticism/Emotional Stability) 
includes traits of moodiness, anxiety, impulsiveness, and vulnerability. Factor Three (Openness 
to Experience) contrasts traits of imagination, intellectual curiosity, and creativity with traits of 
shallowness and imperceptiveness. Factor Four (Conscientiousness) incorporates traits of 
orderliness, reliability, and deliberateness. Factor Five (Agreeableness) contrasts traits of trust, 
kindness, straightforwardness, and compliance with hostility, selfishness, and distrust. 
(Goldberg, 1993).  
 The Big-5 Personality model has been used to demonstrate relations between personality 
traits and various behaviors. Most relevant to the present study, Pirog and Roberts (2007), using 
the Meta-theoretic Model of Motivation (3M) Framework (Mowen, 2000), identified 
relationships between personality traits of neuroticism (emotional instability), introversion, 
conscientiousness, materialism, and need for arousal with credit card misuse in college students. 
Interestingly, all of the relationships were mediated by impulsiveness, with the relationship of 
materialism and need for arousal predicting credit card misuse fully mediated by impulsiveness 
(Pirog & Roberts, 2007).  
In an effort to gain understanding of the construct of impulsivity, Whiteside and Lynam 
(2001) used factor analysis on the five-factor model and four self-report measures of 
impulsiveness (BIS-11, Dickman’s Dysfunctional and Functional Scale, EASI-111, and I-7 
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Impulsiveness Questionnaire). The authors identified four facets of impulsivity that “are not 
considered variations of impulsivity but rather discrete psychological processes that lead to 
impulsive-like behavior” (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001, p. 685). The four facets—urgency, (lack 
of) premeditation, (lack of) perseverance, and sensation-seeking—showed differing relationships 
with the five factors of personality. Whiteside and Lynam argued that these four facets are, in 
fact, separate features of personality that have been mistakenly blended under the larger 
“umbrella term of impulsivity” (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001, p. 684).   
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2 STUDY 1 
2.1 Study Purpose 
The purpose for this study is to answer the following questions: First, what is the relation 
between personality, impulsive consumer behavior, and executive function, as measured by self-
report? Second, what is the relation between personality traits, impulsive consumer behavior, and 
executive function, as measured by standard cognitive assessments? Finally, what is the relation 
between self-reported executive function and standard cognitive assessments of executive 
function? To answer these questions, Study 1 consisted of two large, complementary surveys 
with self-report measures (Study 1A and 1B) of consumer behavior, and Study 2 utilized survey 
methodology with both self-report and behavioral measures, as well as a purchasing task.  
2.2 Study 1, Part A 
2.2.1 Methods 
Participants (N=6,122) were recruited to complete an online survey administered through 
Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI), selected from their existing panel of 4.1 million adult residents in 
the United States.  Recruitment was conducted by SSI sending an email to their existing panel 
with an invitation to participate.  All members of their panel were given said opportunity and 
allowed to refuse if wanted.   SSI compensated participants in a manner commensurate with all 
other surveys available to their existing panel and informed subjects in advance that participation 
was voluntary and could be discontinued at any point within the survey with no penalty. The 
survey was administered to the general population of the SSI panel, with no limitations placed on 
screens, with the exception of a minimum age requirement of 18 years old. All participants 
completed the survey anonymously and were informed in advance that any answers would be 
reported in aggregate with other respondents. As part of the contract with SSI, personally-
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identifiable information was not and will not be released to the investigator of this study. The 
demographics of the SSI panel consist of the following: 50% females, 49% males, and 1% 
transgender, and broad ranges in age (ages 18 to 94 years), education levels (less than high 
school graduate to doctoral level), and socio-economic status. Ethnicity/race information was not 
reported within this dataset, but the SSI national sample is described as representative of the 
population. Approval to analyze these datasets was obtained by Georgia State University 
Institutional Review Board, which ensures the ethical treatment of human subjects.  
2.2.2 Apparatus, Measures and Procedure  
All surveys were administered via SSI. An email invitation was sent to existing panel 
members inviting them to participate in a survey. Survey questions were administered via panel 
members’ personal computer, electronic tablet, or mobile device. After obtaining demographic 
information, including age, gender, and education level, the following tests self-report measures 
were administered in the same order:  
2.2.2.1 Executive function. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Executive Function Index is a 
self-report questionnaire that purports to measure Executive Function on five subscales: 
Motivational Drive, Strategic Planning, Organization, Impulse Control, and Empathy. The 
questionnaire contains 27 items that load on the five subscales. Items are rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale. Items are listed in Appendix A. As of the writing of his study, reliability and 
internal consistency estimates have not been published.  
2.2.2.2 Credit card misuse. Credit card misuse was measured using a 12-item, five-point 
Likert scale developed by Roberts and Jones (2001). Individuals with higher scale scores could 
be viewed as being less responsible in the use of their credit cards. The scale exhibited good 
internal consistency (a = .78) in a previous study (Omar, Sainz, Rahim, Che Wel, & Shah, 
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2014). A list of scale items is provided in Appendix B. 
2.2.2.3 Impulsiveness. The Brief Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-8) is an 8-item self-
report instrument designed to assess the construct of impulsiveness (Stanford et al., 2009). The 
BIS-8 version utilized in this study identifies first-order factors of attention, motor, self-control, 
cognitive complexity, perseverance, and cognitive instability. Second-order factors of attention  
impulsivity, motor impulsivity, and non-planning are additionally identified. Internal validity for 
the total BIS-8 is .83 (Stanford et al, 2009). A list of items is provided in Appendix C.  
2.2.2.4 Five-factor personality measure. The Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) was 
used to gain a measure of the Big Five personality dimensions. This instrument was designed to 
offer a brief version of the larger Big Five Index with each item representing one pole of the 
Five-Factor Model dimensions. Mean test-retest reliability for the overall measure is .80, with 
each factor test-retest reliability as the following: Extraversion .82, Openness to Experience .80, 
Agreeableness .76, Conscientiousness .76, and Emotional Stability .81 (Gosling, Rentfrow, & 
Swann Jr., 2003). Items are listed in Appendix D.  
2.2.2.5 Spending and value seeking. Nine items were asked in a previous survey 
designed for consumer research (N=6,037) to identify types of consumer behavior. An EFA was 
performed to identify factors of consumer behavior. Internal consistency for this measure was 
considered good (a=.88). A principal components exploratory factor analysis was performed to 
identify factors of consumer behavior. Promax rotation was used, and no limitation of number of 
factors was placed. Two factors emerged, which were titled Spending (S) and Value Seeking 
(VS). These two factors accounted for 76.83% of the total variability (spending, 32.38%; value 
seeking, 44.45%). These questions and their factor loadings were the following:  
• I frequently search for values and coupons (.78 VS);  
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• I never pay for anything full price (.71 VS);  
• Researching for lower prices and ways to save money is something I do frequently (.79 
VS);  
• I typically wait for a sale to purchase something (.78 VS);  
• I don’t spend money unless I feel I am getting a really good deal (.65 VS);  
• I buy things I don’t really need (-.81S);  
• I spend more money than I can afford (-.82 S);  
• If I want something, I buy it whether I can afford it or not (-.75 S);  
• I don’t really consider my budget when I really want to buy something (-.86 S).  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Measure Assessments 
2.3.1.1 Impulsivity. A principal components exploratory factor analysis was used to 
identify factor loadings and structure for the eight items in the Brief Barratt Impulsivity Scale 
used in these studies. Promax rotation was used, as items were assumed, from previous theory 
and knowledge of the scale, to be correlated. No limitation on the number of factors were set. 
Two factors were identified and subsequently titled Impulse Action (40.97%) and Impulse Plan 
(30.87%), and together accounted for 71.83% total variance. Four items loaded for each factor as 
follows:  
• I plan tasks carefully (.82, IP);  
• I do things without thinking (.88, IA);  
• I don’t “pay attention” (.84, IA);  
• I am self-controlled (.81, IP);  
• I concentrate easily (.84, IP);  
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• I am a careful thinker (.864, IP);  
• I say things without thinking (.8, IA);  
• I act on the spur of the moment (.84, IA).  
 
2.3.1.2 Preliminary and bivariate analyses. Descriptive statistics were calculated for all 
the variables. A correlational analysis (Appendix E) was generated for age, all subscale measures 
of the EFI (MD, SP, IC, EM, ORG), credit card misuse, value seeking, and spending behavior. 
Age was moderately correlated with subscales of the Executive Function Index (impulse control, 
r = -.44; organization, r = -.41) and credit-card misuse (r = .41). Consequently, age was 
controlled for as a covariate in subsequent analyses. Group comparisons between gender groups 
on all measures of EFI (subscales and total EFI) and on measures of consumer behavior 
indicated no significant differences (p > .10), so gender was not controlled for or otherwise 
considered in the subsequent analyses.  
After confirmation of normality of distribution of the variables, zero-order correlational 
analysis (Appendix E) was used to identify relations between the variables of the executive 
function index (EFI), the five-factor personality inventory (TIPI), impulsiveness, credit-card 
misuse, value-seeking, and spending. All of the variables were found to correlate significantly 
with each other, but this result was expected, given the large sample used. Some correlations 
were moderate to strong: EFI strategic planning with credit card misuse r(6122) = .53, p < .001; 
EFI impulse control with credit card misuse, r(6122) = .54, p<.001; EFI organization with credit 
card misuse, r(6122) = .51, p < .001; EFI organization with Impulse Action, r(6211)=.57, p < 
.001; EFI Impulse Control with Impulse Action, r(6211)=.57, p <. 001; and EFI organization 
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with impulsive consumer behavior, r(6211)=.53, p < .001. All additional correlations were weak 
(between -.4 and .4) at best, even though most were statistically significant.  
Clearly, there are many interesting ways that these data could be analyzed further. 
However, the focus of the present project was on relations to consumer behavior, and thus those 
are the questions that will be addressed here. In addition to examining the component measures, 
an overall composite score for impulsive consumer behavior was created by first reverse-scoring 
the value-seeking items, and then averaging the overall (reversed) score for value seeking with 
the total scores for spending and credit card misuse measures. Consequently, higher scores on the 
composite consumer behavior score reflects more spending and credit card misuse, together with 
less value-seeking. Extreme groups for the composite consumer behavior measure were 
identified as high, average, and low, using approximately top 10% as high and approximately 
bottom 10% as low, with the remaining 80% as average. For the Impulsive Consumer Behavior 
measure, approximately 10% of participants were considered to have High Impulsive Consumer 
Behavior (N=616; range 4.86 to 7). Approximately 10% of participants were considered to have 
Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior (N=593; range 1 to 2.36), and the remaining 80% were 
considered to have average Impulsive Consumer Behavior. The large sample size allowed for 
adequate group sizes to focus this extreme-groups comparison on the top and bottom 10% of 
scores. In the two extreme groups, ages were evenly distributed in both groups. The Low 
Impulsive Consumer group was composed of 56% male, 43% female, 1% transgender; mean age 
of 46.63. The High Impulsive Consumer group was composed of 59% male, 41% female, 1% 
transgender; mean age of 33.64. To adjust for multiple comparisons, all subsequent analyses 
were only considered significant if a p-value measured less than .001. In addition, in all 
subsequent analyses within this study, age is identified and controlled for as a covariate.  
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A series of one-way ANCOVAs were performed to compare the means of all subscales of 
the EFI between high and low groups of impulsive consumer behavior, while controlling for the 
covariate age. Significant differences between high and low impulsive consumer behavior groups 
were observed in EFI impulse control, F(1,1208)=1183.72, p < .001, ƞ2=.507, and EFI 
organization, F(1,1208)=1239.75, p < .001, ƞ2=.495. Individuals with higher impulsive consumer 
behavior scored lower in EFI Organization and Impulse Control, as evidenced in Table 2.1. No 
significant differences were observed between the extreme groups in EFI strategic planning, 
motivational drive, or empathy (see Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 EFI and High vs. Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior Groups 
 
(*p < .001) Impulsive Consumer 
Behavior 
Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Motivational Drive Low 3.388 .029 3.332 3.444 
High 3.649 .028 3.594 3.704 
 
Organization* 
 
Low 
 
3.839 
 
.035 
 
3.771 
 
3.907 
High 2.135 .034 2.068 2.201 
 
Strategic Planning 
 
Low 
 
3.306 
 
.025 
 
3.257 
 
3.354 
High 3.760 .024 3.713 3.808 
 
Impulse Control* 
 
Low 
 
3.709 
 
.033 
 
3.644 
 
3.773 
High 2.125 .032 2.062 2.189 
 
Empathy 
 
Low 
 
3.640 
 
.029 
 
3.584 
 
3.696 
High 3.891 .028 3.836 3.946 
 
 
A series of one-way ANCOVAs were also performed to compare means of all five 
measures of personality (openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and 
extroversion) between high and low groups of impulsive consumer behavior. There were 
significant differences between high and low impulsive consumer behavior for conscientiousness 
F(1,1208) = 263.89, p < .001, ƞ2=.179, but not the other measures of personality (see Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2 Personality Measure and High vs. Low Impulse Consumer Behavior Groups 
 
(*p < .001) Impulsive Consumer 
Behavior 
Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Neuroticism Low 5.990 .098 5.797 6.183 
High 7.748 .096 7.559 7.938 
 
Openness 
 
Low 
 
9.636 
 
.095 
 
9.450 
 
9.822 
High 8.872 .093 8.689 9.054 
 
Conscientiousness* 
 
Low 
 
11.209 
 
.102 
 
11.010 
 
11.409 
High 8.896 .100 8.700 9.092 
 
Agreeableness 
 
Low 
 
10.019 
 
.092 
 
9.838 
 
10.199 
High 8.651 .090 8.474 8.828 
 
Extroversion 
 
Low 
 
7.872 
 
.102 
 
7.672 
 
8.071 
High 8.161 .100 7.965 8.356 
 
One-way ANCOVAs demonstrated a significant difference between high and low 
impulsive consumer behavior groups on Impulse Action, F(1,1209) = 749.40, p < .001, ƞ2 = .383, 
indicating those who scored highest in impulsive consumer behavior were significantly higher in 
BIS-8 motor impulsiveness than those who were lower in impulsive consumer behavior. No 
significant differences between high and low consumer behavior groups was seen for Impulse 
Plan were identified (see Table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.3 Impulsivity and High vs. Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior Groups 
 
(*p < .001) Impulsive Consumer 
Behavior 
Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Impulse action* Low 2.128 .039 2.051 2.205 
High 3.634 .039 3.559 3.710 
 
Impulse plan 
 
Low 
 
2.361 
 
.037 
 
2.288 
 
2.434 
High 1.923 .037 1.851 1.995 
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2.4 Study 1, Part B 
2.4.1 Methods 
Participants (N=6,000) were recruited, as in Study 1 Part A, to complete an online survey 
administered through Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI) to their existing panel of 4.1 million residents 
in the United States. Recruitment was conducted by SSI providing an email with details for the 
study to their existing panel.  SSI compensated participants in a manner commensurate with all 
other surveys available to their existing panel. Volunteers were informed in advance that 
participation was voluntary and could be discontinued at any point within the survey with no 
penalty. The survey was administered to the general population of the SSI panel, with no 
limitations placed on screens, with the exception of a minimum age requirement of 18 years old. 
All participants completed the survey anonymously and were informed in advance that any 
answers would be reported in aggregate with other respondents. As part of the contract with SSI, 
no personally-identifiable information was or will be delivered to the author of this study. The 
demographics of the SSI panel consist of the following: 50% females, 49% males, and 1% 
transgender, and broad ranges in age (ages 18 to 96 years; mean 44 years old), education levels 
(less than high school graduate to doctoral level), and socio-economic status. Ethnicity/race 
information was not provided in this dataset. Approval was obtained by Georgia State University 
Institutional Review Board to analyze this archival dataset.  
2.4.2 Apparatus and Measures  
All apparatus and measures were repeated from Study 1, Part A, with the addition of two 
consumer-behavior measures of Opportunity Seeking Behavior and Financial Risk Taking, and 
the removal of spending and value seeking measures.  
2.4.2.1 Opportunity seeking behavior. Five statements were placed within the survey 
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regarding participants’ behavior within the last five years. Participants self-reported their 
frequency of participation using a seven-point Likert scale with response items as follows: 1= 
never, 2= less than once a month, 3= once a month, 4= 2-3 times per month, 5= once a week, 6= 
2-3 times per week, 7= daily. Responses were subjected to a principal components exploratory 
factor analysis, using Promax rotation with no restrictions on numbers of factors. Loadings less 
than .4 were suppressed. All items loaded on one factor to account for 88.59% total variability. 
An overall score was calculated using factor loadings from a factor analysis to weight scores. 
Each question response was multiplied by the respective factor loading. All scores were averaged 
for a final Opportunity Seeking score. The Opportunity Seeking statements, with their factor 
loadings, were: Have you participated in the following within the last five years? Stock Day 
Trading (.947), Real Estate Flipping (.908), Multi-Level Marketing Businesses (.939), Agreed to 
co-sign a loan for a stranger in exchange for money (.961), Investment opportunities on Craig’s 
List or any other online listings (.965), Door to door magazine sales (.957), Business 
opportunities that require an upfront fee (.955), and A side business within your home (Bitcoin, 
Amway, Address labeling, etc.; .896).  Internal consistency was measures using Chronbach’s 
Alpha and found to be (a = .83).  
2.4.2.2 Financial risk taking. Two statements created for this study were placed within 
the survey regarding financial risk-taking behavior. These statements were, “How often do you 
currently engage in financial risk taking (gambling, risky investments, etc.)?” and “How often 
have you engaged financial risk taking like gambling or risky investments in your adult past?” 
Participants self-reported their frequency of participation using a seven-point Likert scale with 
response items as follows: 1= never, 2= less than once a month, 3= once a month, 4= 2-3 times 
per month, 5= once a week, 6= 2-3 times per week, 7= daily. Item responses were added for each 
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participant.  These two questions were created for this specific survey and were not replicated in 
any subsequent survey.  Internal consistency testing was conducted on subsets of this study and 
received Chronbach’s Alpha of (a =.82).  
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Measure Assessments 
2.5.1.1 Impulsivity. As in part A of Study 1, an exploratory factor analysis was used to 
identify factor loadings and structure for the eight items in the BIS used in these studies. Promax 
rotation was used, as items were assumed from previous theory and knowledge of the scale to be 
correlated. No limitation of number of factors were set. Coefficients loading less than .4 were 
suppressed Replicating the results in the part A exploratory factor analysis on impulsivity, two 
factors were identified and matched the previously titled Impulse Action (39.71%) and Impulse 
Plan (24.63%), and cumulatively accounted for 64.34% total variance. As in the previous 
analysis, the same four items loaded for each factor as follows: I plan tasks carefully (.722, IP); I 
do things without thinking (.858, IA); I don’t “pay attention” (.761, IA); I am self-controlled 
(.756, IP); I concentrate easily (.791, IP); I am a careful thinker (.838, IP); I say things without 
thinking (.839, IA); I act on the spur of the moment (.821, IA).  
2.5.1.2 Descriptive and bivariate analyses. First, descriptive statistics were calculated for 
all of the variables. A correlational analysis (Appendix F) was generated between age with all 
sub measures of the EFI (MD, SP, IC, EM, ORG), credit card misuse, opportunity seeking 
behavior, and financial risk taking. Age was moderately correlated with subscales of the 
Executive Function Index (impulse control, r = -.463; organization, r = -.446), credit card misuse 
(r = .464) and opportunity seeking behavior (r = .388). In the subsequent analyses, age was 
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controlled for as a covariate. Gender groups were compared for all dependent variables and 
found to have no significant differences, using independent T-tests (p >.10); thus, it was not 
necessary to control for gender within subsequent analyses.  
After confirmation of normality of distribution of the variables, zero-order correlational 
analysis (Appendix F) was used to identify relations between the variables of executive function 
index (EFI), the five-factor personality inventory (TIPI), impulsiveness (BIS-8), credit card 
misuse, opportunity seeking, and financial risk taking. Moderate to strong correlations were 
identified between EFI impulse control and Impulse Action (r = .-584) and EFI organization (r = 
.689); Impulse Plan with conscientiousness (r = .584) and EFI strategic planning (r = -.687), EFI 
organization with Impulse Action (r = .584), and EFI motivational drive with openness (r = 
.555).  
For subsequent analyses, the composite consumer behavior measure was identified as 
high, average, and low, using approximately top 10% as high and approximately bottom 10% as 
low. The remaining 80% of participants were excluded from the extreme-groups analyses. A 
score for global impulsive consumer behavior was also created by averaging measures of 
opportunity seeking, financial risk taking, and credit card misuse. High Impulsive Consumers 
(N=483) ranged in scores from 1 to 1.43, and Low Impulsive Consumers (N=521) ranged in 
scores from 5.21 to 7.  
As in Study 1A, a series of one-way ANCOVAs was performed to identify differences in 
means of EFI subscales between high and low impulsive consumer behavior. There were 
significant differences between high and low purchase groups in EFI impulse control F(1, 1003) 
= 2,910.79, p < .001, ƞ2 = .744, and EFI organization F(1,1003) = 2,343.31, p < .001, ƞ2=.70, but 
not in any other EFI subscales (see Table 2.4).  
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Table 2.4 EFI and High vs. Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior Groups 
 
(*p < .001) Impulsive Consumer 
Behavior 
Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Motivational drive Low 3.458 .028 3.403 3.513 
High 3.675 .027 3.622 3.728 
 
Organization* 
 
Low 
 
4.019 
 
.031 
 
3.957 
 
4.080 
High 1.904 .030 1.845 1.963 
 
Strategic Planning 
 
Low 
 
3.587 
 
.022 
 
3.544 
 
3.629 
High 3.838 .021 3.798 3.879 
 
Impulse Control* 
 
Low 
 
4.066 
 
.029 
 
4.009 
 
4.123 
High 1.902 .028 1.848 1.957 
 
Empathy 
 
Low 
 
3.989 
 
.027 
 
3.937 
 
4.041 
High 3.760 .026 3.710 3.811 
 
A series of one-way ANCOVAs were also performed to compare means of all five 
measures of personality (openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and 
extroversion) between high and low groups of impulsive consumer behavior. There were 
significant differences between high and low impulsive consumer behavior groups for 
conscientiousness F(1,1003) = 1,319.35, p < .001, ƞ2 = .568, but not the other measures of 
personality. The possible range of scores for all of the personality measures ranged from 2 to 14 
(see Table 2.5).  
Table 2.5 Personality and High vs. Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior Groups 
 
(*p < .001) Impulsive Consumer 
Behavior 
Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Extroversion Low 6.894 .114 6.671 7.118 
High 8.299 .110 8.084 8.515 
 
Agreeableness 
 
Low 
 
10.946 
 
.084 
 
10.781 
 
11.111 
High 8.250 .081 8.090 8.409 
 
Neuroticism 
 
Low 
 
5.507 
 
.098 
 
5.314 
 
5.700 
High 7.653 .095 7.467 7.838 
 
Openness 
 
Low 
 
9.427 
 
.097 
 
9.237 
 
9.616 
High 8.378 .093 8.195 8.561 
 
Conscientiousness * 
 
Low 
 
12.400 
 
.079 
 
12.244 
 
12.555 
High 8.405 .076 8.255 8.555 
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A series of one-way ANCOVAs was used to compare high and low impulsive consumer 
group within two types of impulsivity from the BIS-8: Impulse Action and Impulse Plan. Results 
indicated significant differences between high and low impulsive consumer groups in Impulse 
Action, F(1, 1003) = 11,834.11, p < .001, ƞ2 = .647. No significant differences between high and 
low impulsive consumer groups were identified for Impulse Plan (see Table 2.6).  
 
Table 2.6 Impulsivity and High vs. Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior Groups 
 
(*p < .001) Impulsive Consumer 
Behavior 
Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Impulse action* Low 1.872 .035 1.804 1.940 
High 3.932 .033 3.867 3.998 
 
Impulse plan 
 
Low 
 
1.953 
 
.028 
 
1.899 
 
2.008 
High 1.719 .027 1.667 1.771 
 
 
2.6 Study 1 Discussion  
According to Spinella (2005a), he created the Executive Function Index in an attempt to 
generate an efficient and valid self-report measure of executive function for normal populations. 
Spinella’s intent for this measure was for use in large-sample surveys and studies. Through 
factor analysis, Spinella derived the five sub-factors of impulse control, organization, strategic 
planning, motivational drive, and empathy. Previous literature cited in this paper would suggest 
that impulsive consumer behavior should be strongly related to the five subscales of the 
Executive Function Index that are thought to measure working memory capacity, inhibitory 
control, and to a lesser extent, cognitive flexibility. In both parts (A and B) of Study 1, impulsive 
consumer behavior (as measured with various consumer behaviors of opportunity seeking, 
financial risk taking, spending, value seeking, and credit card misuse combined to make 
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composite scores) was consistently associated with significant differences in the subscale 
measures of Impulse Control and Organization within the Executive Function Index, but not in 
the subscales of Motivational Drive, Strategic Planning, and Empathy. These findings suggest 
that EFI Impulse Control and Organization may measure some components of executive function 
as it pertains to or is related to consumer behavior, whereas EFI Motivational Drive, Strategic 
Planning and Empathy do not.  
  The results from this study also demonstrated that the measure for impulsivity (BIS-8) 
reflected two factors for overall impulsivity, called Impulse Action (to reflect motor impulsivity) 
and Impulse Plan (to reflect non-planning and attention control). This outcome from the 
exploratory factor analysis is different from the previous factors of non-planning, motor, and 
attentional impulsiveness earlier identified within the larger Barratt Impulsiveness Measure 
(Witney, Jameson, & Hinson, 2004). For both datasets in Study 1, groups of high and low 
impulsive consumer behavior demonstrated differences within Impulse Action but not Impulse 
Plan. More specifically, the results from this study suggest that the impulsivity related to 
spending behavior, high risk financial investments, financial opportunity seeking, and value-
seeking behaviors reflects impulsive physical activity, motor, or movement like “doing things 
without thinking.” The other type of Impulsivity called Impulse Plan, which is associated with 
the absence of planning, careful thinking, and concentration, was not related to consumer 
behavior.  
In addition, the following variables demonstrated moderate-to-strong correlations in both 
datasets (Parts A and B): EFI Impulse Control and EFI Organization with Impulse Action, EFI 
Strategic Planning with Conscientiousness and Impulse Plan, and EFI Motivational Drive with 
Extroversion. These correlations suggest EFI subscales of Impulse Control and Organization are 
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more closely associated with the type of impulsive behavior (motor impulsivity) related to 
impulsive consumer behavior, and potentially the components of executive function that can 
account for motor impulsivity and impulsive consumer behavior. However, these correlations 
also suggest some subscales of the EFI, specifically Strategic Planning and Motivational Drive, 
are more closely associated with personality traits (conscientiousness and extroversion) than with 
executive functions. Furthermore, subscales of Strategic Planning and Motivational Drive appear 
not to be strongly related with the form of impulsivity related to consumer behavior. For 
personality, only conscientiousness was found to be related to impulsive consumer behavior in 
both datasets, as higher conscientiousness was associated with lower impulsive consumer 
behavior. Conscientiousness was also correlated with Impulse Plan, or impulsivity that results 
from a lack of planning, but not with motor impulsivity (Impulse Action), or with the subscales 
of the EFI (organization and impulse control) that seem to measure components of executive 
function utilized (or not utilized) in impulsive consumer behavior. These findings suggest that 
impulsive consumer behavior may be informed by not just executive functions but perhaps some 
personality trait(s) as well, specifically within a type of impulsivity different from the type 
related and associated with executive functions.  
A possible objection to extreme group comparison methodology may be made and can be 
addressed. The aim of the extreme-group was to see how the most versus least impulsive 
consumers compared on EFI, personality, and BIS measures. Given the size of the current 
sample, it was possible to maintain statistical power even with extreme groups consisting of only 
the top and bottom 10% of the consumer-behavior distribution. However, this does assume that 
these most-extreme spenders differ from the middle 80% quantitatively and linearly, and not 
qualitatively. In support of this assumption, Appendices U and V show the means that would 
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have been obtained had the more traditional quartile splits been used for this analysis. Scores for 
the measures of interest generally varied systematically between the low- and high-impulsive 
consumer behavior groups.  
 As certain EFI subscales demonstrated a relationship with impulsive consumer behavior, 
the results from this study provide some evidence that measures of EFI organization and impulse 
control should correlate with working memory capacity and perhaps inhibitory control, 
respectively; and other subscales of the EFI most likely reflect cognitive flexibility and/or 
personality traits. In addition, the EFI subscales of organization and impulse control are also 
measures that relate to impulsive consumer behavior.  
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3 STUDY 2 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants  
Participants (N = 253) were recruited through Mechanical Turk for Amazon. At any point 
during their participation, volunteers were able to skip a question or choose not to finish without 
penalty. Consent was gained prior to participation. Participants in this study ranged in age from 
18 to 89, with a mean age of 38.5 years. Of the participants, 60% were male, 39% were female, 
and .4% transgender, and the remaining preferred not to answer. Participants identified their 
primary race/ethnicity as follows: 50.3% of participants identified their ethnicity as Caucasian or 
White, 21.7% identified as African-American or Black, 3.6% as Hispanic, 2.0% as Asian, .8% as 
other, and 21.4% preferred not to answer. Average overall response time to the study was 37 
minutes. Participants whose overall response time was less than seven minutes were removed 
from the study (n=11) to ensure thoughtful and deliberate responses from individuals. 
Participants were given a one-hour time limit to complete the study. Approval to conduct this 
research study was obtained by Georgia State University Institutional Review Board prior to 
collecting any data.  
3.1.2 Apparatus and Measures 
A web link generated by Psytoolkit was posted in Mechanical Turk and in Sona Systems 
for Georgia State University for recruitment. Psytoolkit is an open access, privately owned 
website that offers psychological experiments and surveys, all previously validated, for use in 
research. As part of the testing sequence, participants also completed other tasks (e.g., Iowa 
Gambling Task) that are not part of the current study. All measures and questions were 
administered via participants’ personal computers. After obtaining demographic information, 
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including age, gender, and racial/ethnic identification, the following behavioral tests and self-
report measures were administered:  
3.1.2.1 Purchasing behavior. A series of questions were interspersed within the 
experiment to simulate a purchasing experience of a personal mobile device. For the first 
question, participants were asked to quantify a budget for this purchase. Thirteen subsequent 
questions offered additional upgrades for the mobile device as well as a second tablet, all for 
additional cost. All of these questions are listed in Appendix U. The measure for this task was 
calculated with a numerical value for responses of “yes” and “no.” An additional measure was 
calculated between the difference of budget established at the beginning of the survey and the 
total money spent at the end of the study.  
3.1.2.2 Corsi. The Corsi Block Test, similar to digit-span tasks, is a task that presented 
nine blocks or shapes sequentially. Participants were instructed to remember the order of 
sequential presentation and replicate at their own pace. The number of trials for this task was 
based on the success of the previous trial. At a minimum, participants completed two trials with 
two-block spans, which were presented first. A total of 20 Corsi trials would be administered if 
an individual successfully achieved each iteration up to a nine-block span. Participants had to 
respond correctly on two consecutive trials of each span to confirm success of that span length, 
and to move to a larger span. The presentation of stimuli was set at 500 milliseconds per block 
with a countdown before the first block display. The dependent measure for this task was the 
highest span length a participant achieved. This span measure was considered an estimate of 
working memory capacity. Most healthy adults will score between a 5- and 7-item span on the 
manual version of this task (Corsi, 1972). This task was administered twice within the study, and 
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the average participants’ Corsi span from both administrations was calculated and used in 
subsequent analyses.  
3.1.2.3 Task/attention-switching. Attention shifting tasks may reflect set-switching or 
cognitive flexibility and are considered one measure of executive function. The GRID task used 
in this study (a version of the Letter-Number task described by Rogers and Monsell, 1995) 
involves a numeral-letter pair displayed in 2000 milliseconds in one of four cells of a 2x2 grid on 
the screen. If the characters appear in one of the top two cells, participants must indicate whether 
the numeral is odd or even. If the characters appear in either of the bottom cells, participants 
must respond by pressing letter “B” or “N,” depending on whether the letter is consonant or 
vowel. Repeated trials with either rule are used to establish a baseline speed for making the 
odd/even or consonant/vowel judgment. Set-switching trials occur whenever the rule for trial N 
is different than the rule for trial N-1. The difference between these response times (switch time) 
provides a measure of cognitive flexibility, such that shorter switch times indicated higher 
cognitive flexibility. For this study, a set of 20 practice trials for letters only on the top two cells 
and then another set of 20 trials for numbers only on the bottom two cells were given prior to 
100 complete trials of both letters and numbers, with the cell selected randomly for each trial 
from the entire grid. This task provides measurements of two types of performance cost: mix cost 
and switch cost. Mix cost is the performance cost to mix two different tasks, and switch cost is 
the performance cost to switch between two sequentially presented tasks.  
3.1.2.4 N-Back. The N-Back task is a behavioral measure that was introduced by Wayne 
Kirchner (1958). This measure is used primarily as a measure of working memory capacity. The 
task requires a participant, while being presented with a sequence of stimuli, to identify 
whenever a current stimulus matches a stimulus N positions back in the sequence. Thus, 
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participants are required in this task continuously to update their working memories to keep track 
of the most recent N items to compare to the current stimulus. To do so, participants must both 
hold and manipulate information to be successful. For this study, the N was set to 3-back in the 
sequence. Two sets of 50 trials of N-back were given, each at a 500-millisecond display of each 
letter in the sequence.  
3.1.2.5 Stroop. The Stroop task has been a standard for measuring inhibitory control 
since developed by Stroop (1935). The color-word task requires individuals to identify the font 
colors of color words and is a measure of executive attention and inhibitory control. Within this 
task, there are trials in which the color used to display the word is either same (congruent) or 
different (incongruent) to the meaning of the color word. The difference in response times 
between incongruent and baseline trials (or sometimes, as was done here, between incongruent 
and congruent trials) is identified as the Stroop effect, and reflects the cost of interference from 
the irrelevant cue (word meaning) on the attended cue (word color; Stroop, 1935). For this study, 
participants completed 40 trials. Colors/words used were yellow, blue, red, and green. Stimuli 
were presented and participants were required to respond by pressing the y, r, b, or g key based 
on color of the word within 2000 ms. After a response, a new trial was presented within 500 
seconds. The Stroop task in Psytoolkit was written to include 27% congruent trials and 63% 
incongruent trials, in random order.  
3.1.2.6 Go/No-Go. Go/No-Go tasks can be a measure of impulsivity, as participants are 
required to inhibit a habitual response. In this particular version, participants were given a cue of 
Go and required to respond by clicking the space bar. A cue of No-Go was also given in which 
participants were not to respond. Difficulty was increased by presenting more Go cues than No-
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Go cues. Errors and response times are used for the measure of behavioral inhibition. This task 
presented 20 Go trials and five No-Go trials.  
3.1.2.7 Stop Signal. The Stop Signal task (Lappin & Erickson, 1966) is a variation of 
Go/No-Go and is used to measure inhibitory control. For this particular version, participants 
were required to respond with either letters b or n, depending on whether the cue (arrow) was 
pointing left or right, respectively. Responses were required within 500 milliseconds of stimulus 
presentation, and feedback was given after 250 milliseconds. The response-offset asynchrony 
was 2000 milliseconds after a wrong response, with no delay after a correct response. After a 
training phase, a red circle (stop signal) appeared on some trials, in which participants are not to 
respond to the direction of the arrow. False-alarms (errors) in response were considered measures 
of inability to inhibit response. A total of 50 go trials and 20 stop-signal trials, in random order, 
were given in this task.  
3.1.2.8 Wisconsin Card Sort. The Wisconsin Card Sort Task used for this study is 
grounded in Grant & Berg’s (1948) version used to measure cognitive flexibility. For this study, 
participants were presented with four cards that could be classified in three different ways: color 
of symbols on the card (yellow, blue, green, or red), shape of the symbols (circle, start, cross, 
triangle), or number of symbols (one, two, three, four) on each card. The classification rule 
changed every ten cards. Thus, the task required participants to figure out the sorting rule via 
trial-and-error, and then to switch to a new rule when necessary. The task measures how well an 
individual adapts to changing rules, with perseverations (repeated attempts with an old rule) as a 
measure of cognitive (in)flexibility. For this particular version, participants were given up to ten 
seconds to respond to each card before a new trial was presented. A total of 74 trials were given 
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in this task. Visual and auditory feedback (either “correct” or “wrong”) was provided for 500ms 
after each trial so that participants could learn the classification rule.  
3.1.2.9 Other measures. The measures for Impulsiveness, Credit Card Misuse, Five 
Factor Personality Inventory, and Executive Function Index were the same self-report measures 
utilized in the Study 1, parts A and B. These items are exhibited in Appendices A, B, C, D, and 
E. Questions for the purchasing task are exhibited in Appendix U.  
3.1.2.10 Procedure. All surveys were completed online, and participants were 
compensated five dollars when recruited through Mechanical Turk. The entire study was 
administered through a link to the host website (psytoolkit.org). The subsequent order of 
questions and experiments are listed in Appendix I.  
3.2 Results 
First, demographics were measured to determine whether there were any significant 
effects of age, gender, and ethnicity/race on all other variables, including the dependent variables 
of purchasing, and credit card misuse (See Appendix L & M). Some of the correlations with age 
were significant (age correlations range: -.023 to .27), so age was controlled as a covariate in all 
subsequent ANOVAs. No significant differences between gender or race/ethnicity groups were 
observed in a series of independent samples t-tests (p >. 16); consequently, subsequent ANOVAs 
did not include these grouping variables. 
Means and standard deviations were calculated for the variables of Executive Function 
Index (EFI), the Five Factor Personality Inventory, the BIS-8, and all behavioral computerized 
tasks (N-back, Corsi, Stop Signal, Task Switching, Stroop, Wisconsin Card Sorting, and Go/No-
Go; see Appendix K for descriptive statistics).  
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3.2.1 Correlations Between EFI, Executive Function, and Personality  
Next, zero-order correlations were calculated to investigate the associations between the 
indicators of working memory (N-Back and Corsi), cognitive flexibility (Task Switching and 
Wisconsin Card Sorting), and behavioral inhibition (Stroop, Go/No-Go, and Stop Signal), Big 
Five Personality Traits, and Indicators of Impulse Plan and Impulse Action from the BIS-8. 
There were significant correlations, as expected, between measures of each component; however, 
all of the correlations would be considered weak. For working memory, N-back false positives 
were negatively correlated with Corsi mean, r(253) = -.235, p < .001, and positively correlated 
with N-back misses, r(253) = .218, p < .001. Within measures of inhibitory control, Go/No-Go 
response times were correlated with Go/No-Go error rate, r(253) = -.174, p = .005, and Stop 
Signal error rate, r(253) = -.159, p = .011, but were not significantly correlated with Stroop 
accuracy or response-time interference measures. There were no significant correlations between 
measures from the GRID and Wisconsin Card Sorting task.  
In order to identify how much variability in the Executive Function Index was associated 
with the behavioral measures of executive function used in Study 2, bivariate correlations were 
also calculated between EFI subscales of motivational drive (EFI MD), strategic planning (EFI 
SP), organization (EFI ORG), and impulse control (EFI IC), and each measure from the 
behavioral tasks. The full correlational analyses are displayed in Appendices H, I, and J. Some of 
the significant correlations that are relevant to the primary hypotheses are highlighted here. 
Significant correlations were observed between N-back misses and EFI IC r(253) = -.20, p = 
.002, and EFI ORG r(253) = -.16, p = .011, between GO/NO-GO response times and EFI ORG 
r(253) = -.14, p < .023, and between Stop Signal error rate and EFI IC r(253) = -.16, p = .01, and 
EFI ORG r(253) = -.220, p <.001. Wisconsin Card Sort perseveration error rate correlated 
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significantly with EFI IC, r(253) = -.17, p = .007, and ORG r(253) = -.12, p = .049. Task-
switching MixCost and EFI IC correlated significantly as well, r(253) = .17, p =.007. It is 
interesting to note that no significant correlations were found between the two EFI subscales of 
Motivational Drive (MD) and Strategic Planning (SP) and the behavioral tasks selected to 
measure the executive functions of cognitive flexibility, working memory, and inhibitory control. 
These findings from the correlational analyses are displayed in Appendix P.  
To test what relations might exist between the Executive Function Index and the Five 
Factor Personality Inventory, zero-order correlations were examined. Although most 
relationships were found to be significant, almost all demonstrated weak correlational effects of r 
< .40. EFI Organization was found to correlate with all five personality dimensions: extraversion 
r(253) = .18, p < .004, agreeableness r(253) = .36 p < .001, conscientiousness r(253) = .34, p < 
.001, openness r(253) = .29, p <.001, and neuroticism r(253) = .36, p < .001. EFI Impulse 
Control was positively correlated with agreeableness r(253) = .33, p < .001, conscientiousness 
r(253) = .22, p < .001, and neuroticism r(253) = .18, p < .001. Strategic Planning correlated with 
extroversion r(253) = .23, p <.001, agreeableness r(253) = .28, p <.001, conscientiousness r(253) 
= .53, p <.001, neuroticism r(253) = .29, p < .001, and openness r(253) =.20, p < .01. 
Motivational Drive correlated with extraversion r(253) = .63, p <.001, agreeableness r(253) = 
.34, p <.001, conscientiousness r(253) = .36, p < .001, neuroticism r(253) = .44, p < .001, and 
openness r(253) = .55, p < .001. It is important to note that the variables that showed moderate-
to-strong correlations with personality measures were also the two EFI subscales (strategic 
planning and motivational drive) that did not correlate with the behavioral measures of executive 
function used in Study 2. A partial correlation was run between all five measures of personality 
and the three composite scores of executive function: working memory (Nback and Corsi), 
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inhibitory control (Stopsignal, Go/Nogo, and Stroop), and cognitive flexibility (WCT and 
Taskswitching). Inhibitory control was correlated with conscientiousness r(235) = -.160, p = 
.011, and working memory was correlated significantly with extraversion, r(253) = .171, p = 
.007.  
Finally, a partial correlation was performed between the EFI subscales, the composite 
scores of cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, and working memory, while controlling for the 
five scales of personality. All correlations between EFI subscales and EF composite measures 
were not significant when controlling for personality, except for the relationship between EFI 
Organization and inhibitory control. This correlation was significant, r(253) = -.150, p = .019.  
3.2.2 Extreme-Groups Analyses.  
For the subsequent analyses, quartile splits were used to separate participants into groups. 
Composite scores for working memory capacity were created by calculating the averaged z-
scores of the working memory (WM) measures (Corsi max, reverse scored, and N-back misses). 
One-fourth of the original participants were considered to have high WM (n = 61, z range -1.21 
to -0.35), and one-fourth were considered to have low WM (n = 64, z range 0.27 to 1.42). The 
remaining participants (n = 128) were not included in the extreme-groups analyses. In addition, 
high/low categories were similarly created using quartile splits for the composite of inhibition. 
Scores were tabulated by averaging z-scores of Stroop interference, Stroop error, Go/No-Go 
error, and Stop signal error. Approximately one-fourth of participants were considered to have 
low inhibitory control (n=79, z range 24 to 1.47), meaning they had more error and interference 
rates, and one-fourth of participants were considered to have high inhibitory control (n=86, z 
range -.29 to -.89) in that their scores showed less interference and lower error rates. High and 
low categories for cognitive flexibility were also calculated by averaging the z-scores of 
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Wisconsin Card Sort perseveration error and Task switching switch cost. Approximately one-
fourth of participants were considered to have low cognitive flexibility (n= 64, z range -1.58 to -
.51), and approximately one-fourth of participants were considered to have high cognitive 
flexibility (n= .36 to 4.5). 
Various derived measures were calculated within the purchasing task for Study 2. For 
impulsive purchasing behavior, a measure was created by adding the number of yes or no 
responses to the purchasing task questions. The responses were tallied with numerical value of 2 
for yes, and 1 for no. The scores were then coded into groups of high/average/low purchase. The 
bottom quartile of participants was considered to be low spenders (n = 72, range 12-21), and the 
top quartile was considered to include high spenders (n = 63, range 24-28). This measure was 
named “Times Purchased.” Second, a simple addition of all money amounts a participant 
indicated they were willing to spend was calculated and called “Purchase Total.” Third, the total 
amount a participant purchased minus the amount participants reported as purchased at the end 
of the task was calculated and named “Purchase Total Known.” This is how accurately 
participants remembered the amount of money they had been willing to spend. Fourth, the total 
amount purchased minus the original budget was calculated and called “Purchase Difference 1.” 
A fifth calculation was made by subtracting the participants reported budget at the end of the 
survey from the actual amount spent to that point. This calculation was “Purchase Difference 2.” 
The final calculation was made by subtracting the reported budget at the end of the survey (Q16) 
from the initial amount budgeted at the beginning of the survey (Q1) and was titled “Budget 
Difference.” This is a measure of how well participants remembered their original budget. For 
each of these purchasing-behavior measures, extreme groups were formed using quartile splits. 
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For all subsequent analyses, an alpha level of .001 was established for significance in 
order to address multiple comparisons and analyses.  
3.2.3 EFI Effects on Executive Function  
A series of one-way ANOVAs were performed to identify differences between high and 
low extreme groups of each of the Executive Function Index on the three composite scores 
developed for cognitive flexibility, working memory, and inhibitory control. Of these analyses, 
there were significant differences between high and low groups of EFI Organization on 
inhibitory control, F(1,136) = 9.50, p =.001, ƞ2 = .056; although the effect of EFI Impulse 
Control on working memory approached this threshold, F(1,135) = 7.174, p = .002, ƞ2 = .053. 
These results indicate individuals who scored high in Organization on the EFI were significantly 
higher in inhibitory control in behavioral tasks. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 demonstrate these 
findings. No significant differences were found in extreme-groups analyses of the other EFI 
subscales. 
 
Table 3.1 EFI Organization Extreme Groups on Executive Function 
 
Dependent Variable EFI Organization Score Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Cognitive 
Flexibility 
High .133 .090 -.045 .312 
Low -.073 .084 -.239 .092 
 
Working  
Memory 
 
High 
 
.155 
 
.078 
 
.002 
 
.309 
Low -.043 .072 -.186 .100 
 
Inhibitory Control* 
 
High 
 
.120 
 
.053 
 
.016 
 
.225 
Low -.102 .049 -.199 -.005 
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Table 3.2 EFI Impulse Control Extreme Groups on Executive Function 
 
 EFI Impulse Control 
Score 
Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Cognitive flexibility Low .077 .099 -.118 .272 
High .108 .094 -.078 .293 
 
Working  
Memory* 
 
Low 
 
-.082 
 
.073 
 
-.225 
 
.062 
High .201 .077 .050 .352 
 
Inhibitory  
Control 
 
Low 
 
-.027 
 
.052 
 
-.130 
 
.077 
High .114 .055 .005 .230 
 
3.2.4 Purchasing Behavior Effects on Executive Function  
A series of one-way ANCOVAs, with a covariate of age, were used to identify 
differences between extreme groups of purchase total on composite executive function 
components of working memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility. Within the 
univariate analyses, a significant difference was identified between high and low groups of 
purchase total for the working memory composite, F(1,137) = 18.62, p < .001, ƞ2 = .12. The high 
and low purchase total groups did not differ significantly in inhibitory control or cognitive 
flexibility (see descriptive statistics in Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.3 Purchase Total Extreme Groups on Executive Function 
 
 Total Purchase Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Working  
Memory* 
Low .230 .065 .100 .359 
High -.190 .072 -.332 -.048 
 
Inhibitory  
Control 
 
Low 
 
.026 
 
.059 
 
-.090 
 
.142 
High .116 .054 .011 .222 
 
Cognitive Flexibility 
 
Low 
 
-.116 
 
.086 
 
-.286 
 
.054 
High .066 .078 -.088 .221 
 
3.2.5 Executive Function Effects on Purchasing Behavior  
Similarly, a series of one-way ANCOVAs were used to identify differences between 
extreme groups of working memory on all of the measures for purchasing. Within the univariate 
analyses, five significant differences between high and low working memory groups were 
identified. First, a significant difference was found between working-memory groups on 
purchase total, (how much the participants actually spent), F(1,124) = 26.91, p < .001, ƞ2 = .216. 
Second, a significant difference was observed between groups on purchase total known (how 
accurately participants recalled the amount they spent), F(1,124) = 21.82, p < .001, ƞ2 = 117. 
Third, a significant difference was identified between the high and low WMC groups on 
purchase difference 1 (the difference between the amount participants actually purchased and 
how much they reported their budget to be at the beginning of the survey), F(124) = 28.31, p 
<.001, ƞ2 = 211. Fourth, there was a significant difference between WMC groups for purchase 
difference 2 (the difference between the amount participants spent and what they remembered 
and reported their original budget to be at the end of the survey), F(1,124) = 20.15, p < .001, ƞ2 = 
.184. A final significant difference was between WM groups in times purchased (the total 
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number of times they chose to purchase), F(1,124) = 18.04, p < .001, ƞ2 = .145. Descriptive 
statistics for these comparisons are shown in Table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.4 Working Memory Extreme Groups on Executive Function 
 
Dependent Variable 
Working 
Memory Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Purchase Total* High 411.016 52.261 307.576 514.455 
Low 797.500 53.097 692.405 902.595 
 
Purchase Total 
Known* 
 
High 
 
-25.531 
 
55.754 
 
-135.884 
 
84.822 
Low 345.742 56.646 233.623 457.861 
 
Purchase Difference* 
 
High 
 
101.250 
 
50.802 
 
.699 
 
201.801 
Low 486.565 51.615 384.405 588.724 
 
Purchase Difference* 
Two 
 
High 
 
-29.547 
 
65.432 
 
-159.056 
 
99.962 
Low 397.565 66.479 265.983 529.146 
 
Budget Difference 
 
High 
 
-130.797 
 
42.486 
 
-214.888 
 
-46.705 
Low -89.000 43.166 -174.437 -3.563 
 
Times Purchased* 
 
High 
 
20.952 
 
.413 
 
22.635 
 
24.271 
Low 23.453 .420 20.121 21.782 
 
A series of one-way ANCOVAs were conducted to identify meaningful differences 
between high and low groups of inhibitory control or high and low groups of cognitive flexibility 
within all of the purchasing measures. No significant differences were identified (p >.10 for all). 
3.2.6 EFI Effects on Purchasing Behavior  
Quartile splits were used to form high and low groups on each of the EFI subscales, and 
then a series of one-way ANCOVAs were performed to identify differences between high and 
low EFI subscales of impulse control, organization, strategic planning, empathy, and 
motivational drive groups on purchasing behavior measures. For these quartile splits, high 
indicates better or more impulse control, organization, strategic planning, empathy, and 
motivational drive. Only the EFI Organization subscale demonstrated significant differences in 
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purchasing behavior. High and low groups of EFI Organization were significantly different for 
the purchasing measures of purchase total, F(1,140) = 10.79, p = .001, ƞ2 = .072, and on times 
purchased, F(1,140) = 11.12, p =.001, ƞ2 = .075. Participants in the low EFI Organization group 
spent significantly more and made significantly more purchases than high EFI Organization 
participants, as is shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 EFI Organization Extreme Groups comparisons on Purchasing Behavior 
 
Dependent Variable Organization Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Purchase Total* Low 672.109 52.160 568.973 775.246 
High 439.605 47.865 344.961 534.250 
 
Purchase Total Known 
 
Low 
 
194.391 
 
54.316 
 
86.991 
 
301.790 
High 10.789 49.844 -87.767 109.346 
 
Purchase Difference 
 
Low 
 
344.641 
 
52.394 
 
241.041 
 
448.240 
High 121.184 48.080 26.115 216.254 
 
Purchase Difference 
Two 
  
Low 
 
239.281 
 
63.657 
 
113.411 
 
365.151 
 High -21.592 58.416 -137.098 93.914 
 
Budget Difference 
 
Low 
 
-105.359 
 
42.017 
 
-188.440 
 
-22.279 
High -142.776 38.557 -219.016 -66.536 
 
Times Purchased* 
 
Low 
 
23.316 
 
.384 
 
20.819 
 
22.337 
High 21.578 .352 22.619 24.012 
 
 
3.2.7 Executive Function Effects on Impulsivity.  
However, in a series of ANCOVAs, participants in the high and low groups of inhibitory 
control demonstrated significant differences for impulse action, F(1,128) = 13.228, p <.001, ƞ2 = 
.178, but not impulse plan, F(1,128) = .185, p = .852, ƞ2 = .003. High and low groups of 
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cognitive flexibility and working memory demonstrated no significant differences in either 
impulse action or impulse plan, although the working memory comparison for impulse action (p 
= .002) approached the conservative threshold set for these multiple comparisons, as shown in 
Error! Reference source not found.. Participants high in inhibitory control scored significantly 
more in impulse action, as shown in  
 
Table 3.. 
Table 3.6 Inhibitory Control Extreme Group Comparison on Impulsivity 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 Working Memory Extreme Group Comparison on Impulsivity 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8 Cognitive Flexibility Extreme Group Comparison on Impulsivity 
 
 Cognitive Flexibility Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Impulse Plan Low 6.292 .513 5.276 7.308 
High 5.627 .567 4.505 6.749 
Impulse Action Low 9.903 .646 8.626 11.180 
High 8.831 .713 7.420 10.241 
 Inhibition Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Impulse Plan High 5.600 .504 4.602 6.598 
Low 6.286 .512 5.272 7.300 
 
Impulse Action 
 
High 
 
7.877 
 
.609 
 
6.673 
 
9.081 
Low 11.032 .618 9.808 12.255 
 
 Working Memory Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Impulse Plan High 6.000 .558 4.895 7.105 
Low 5.758 .567 4.635 6.881 
Impulse Action High 8.094 .628 6.851 9.336 
Low 10.984 .638 9.722 12.246 
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3.3 Discussion 
Spinella (2007) claimed that EFI measures executive function. The correlational results 
from Study 2 offer some evidence regarding the accuracy of that claim. On the one hand, the 
results revealed that measures of EFI Organization and Impulse Control subscales were 
correlated with performance-based measures of working memory and inhibitory control. On the 
other hand, these correlations were very weak, and the other subscales of the EFI were unrelated 
to executive function task performance. At most, it may be inferred that only EFI Organization 
and Impulse Control measure some aspects of the executive function components described by 
Miyake and Friedman (2012).  
It is noteworthy, however, that subscales of the EFI demonstrated stronger correlations 
with the Five Factor Personality measures than the behavioral measures of working memory 
capacity, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility. To test whether or not the differences in 
these correlations were significant, z-tests were performed on the highest scoring correlation for 
the EFI subscales and compared between the behavioral measures and personality scales. These 
comparisons found there was no significant difference between the correlations between Impulse 
Control and Nback misses and Agreeableness, p = .1236. For Organization, there was a 
significant difference between correlations with Stop Signal and Agreeableness, with Stop Signal 
being the higher correlation, p = .0418. For both Strategic Planning and Motivational Drive, the 
correlations with all behavioral measures were not significant. The comparisons between r scores 
of the strongest correlation with a behavioral measure of executive function and 
conscientiousness (p = .0274) and extroversion (p = .0183), respectively, demonstrated 
significant differences. Thus, it can be argued that the Executive Function Index is more strongly 
correlated with personality measures rather than executive function.  
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These findings suggest that the EFI, while somewhat measuring executive functions 
through the two subscales of Impulse Control and Organization, may be more successful at 
measuring either personality traits or a common variable that informs both executive function 
and personality with the two subscales of Motivational Drive and Strategic Planning.  
These results may be at least partially accounted for by method variance, or mono-
method bias, given both the EFI and Big Five measures are self-report surveys. That is, variables 
that affect self-report instruments—whether those variables reflect temperament (e.g., openness 
and conscientiousness may influence how one responds to self-report items, irrespective of scale) 
or cognition (e.g., memory failures or biases might influence what gets reported, irrespective of 
the topic of the scale)—might be common across instruments, and thus inflate the inter-
correlation of self-reports. Researchers have attempted to minimize these effects by using 
various methods, for instance by using partial correlation methodology. Thus, this paper is 
limited in acknowledging and addressing how much of the correlations between the EFI and the 
Big Five can be accounted for in common method variance, as well as whether or not the 
correlations between the behavior tasks in EF used in this study with the EFI (Lindell & Witney, 
2001; Spector, 2006). 
A third possibility is that personality traits moderate or mediate relationships with 
components of executive function. In particular, self-insight and response to self-report may (and 
most likely would be) influenced by current knowledge of one’s personality. The literature on 
the relation between personality and EF is growing in size but not in clarity. Significant 
relationships between personality dimensions and particular executive functions have been 
reported, but typically not replicated (e.g., Buchanan, 2015; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2010; 
Unsworth et al., 2009; Williams, Suchy, & Rau, 2009). For example, Williams et al. (2009) 
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summarized evidence and arguments that conscientiousness and EF reflect common 
neurocognitive systems, and Buchanan (2015) reported some evidence to support such a 
relationship; however, Soubelet and Salthouse (2011) and Unsworth et al. (2009) found no 
relationships between EF tasks and conscientiousness (as the present findings corroborated) but 
rather reported a relationship between EF and openness. The only thing that seems clear at this 
point is that the personality-EF relationship remains unclear. 
Nevertheless, it could be proposed that executive function (as measured by Spinella’s 
index) informs or modulates the constructs of personality traits, as measured in the five-factor 
personality inventory, or vice versa. In order to test this possibility, a partial correlation was 
performed between the EFI subscales, the composite scores of cognitive flexibility, inhibitory 
control, and working memory, while controlling for the five scales of personality. Of all the 
possible correlations, the relationship between EFI Organization and inhibitory control was 
significant, r(253) = .019. Thus, it can be argued that all but one of the subscales within the EFI 
measure personality traits rather than executive function constructs.  
The high and low EFI subscale comparisons substantiate the one significant partial 
correlation previously identified. The significant difference between high and low EFI 
Organization on inhibitory control offers additional support that the EFI Organization subscale is 
the one part of the EFI that demonstrates the ability to measure some executive function, in 
particular, inhibitory control. In addition, the EFI Organization was also the only subscale that 
demonstrated differences in consumer behavior between high and low groups. However, the 
additional subscales of the EFI demonstrated no significant differences within groups on 
executive functions. Consequently, the correlational results from this study, as well as extreme 
group comparisons, offer minimal evidence of the Executive Function Index as a strong and 
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valid measure of executive function, at least as measured with the present tasks that were 
selected to reflect Miyake and Friedman’s (2012) model.  
A different picture emerges from the between-groups comparisons of task performance, 
summarized in   
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Table 3.. Results from the purchasing task within Study 2 indicate significant differences 
between working memory groups (as measured by a composite score of Corsi and N-back tasks) 
on consumer behavior. In fact, extreme groups formed on working memory scores differed not 
only in how often an individual chose to purchase, but also how much hypothetical money was 
spent, the difference between the participant’s stated budget and the amount spent, as well as 
how well the participant kept a running tally of the amount spent or remembered what their 
initial budget was at the time they finished the tasks. Individuals who scored higher in working 
memory were more successful in self-regulatory behaviors in the purchasing task by using 
updating and monitoring skills more successfully than individuals with lower working memory. 
These results support the common finding that working memory capacity is closely related to 
self-regulatory behavior (Barratt, 2004; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; Ilkowska & Engele, 
2010; Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & 
Baddeley, 2012; Witney, 2003). 
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Table 3.9 Summary of extreme-groups differences from Study 2 
 
High Working Memory 
 
Low Working Memory 
 <Purchase Total  
 
<Impulsive Purchase 
 
 
<Purchase Difference 
 
 
<Purchase Total Known 
 
High Purchase Total 
 
Low Purchase Total 
 <Working Memory  
High Inhibitory Control 
 
Low Inhibitory Control 
 <Impulse Action  
 >Working Memory  
High EFI Organization 
 
Low EFI Organization 
 
<Purchase Total  
 
 <Impulsive Purchase  
 >Inhibitory Control  
 
Regarding personality traits and consumer behavior, Study 2 did not replicate the 
relationship between conscientiousness and impulsive consumer behavior identified in both parts 
of Study 1. A strong correlation between EFI Strategic Planning and Conscientiousness was 
identified, but neither were significantly associated with any measures of consumer behavior 
within Study 2. In addition, the EFI measures of Motivational Drive and Strategic Planning, 
which correlated with personality instead of executive function as measured by cognitive 
measures, were not significantly related to consumer behavior either.  
Thus, within Study 2, behavioral measures that were selected because they are widely 
used to measure the executive-function component of working memory were shown to be related 
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to consumer behavior. However, almost all EFI measures failed to display any relationship with 
consumer behavior. Again, this seems consistent with the interpretation of EFI as a personality 
measure rather than a reliable measure of some executive cognitive ability or operation.  
For self-reported impulsivity (measured by the BIS-8), both inhibitory control and 
working memory revealed differences for Impulse Action but not for Impulse Plan. In addition, 
the EFI subscales of Organization and impulse control were also measures that relate to 
impulsive consumer behavior. These results somewhat replicate the findings by Witney, Jameson 
and Hinson (2004) that working memory capacity and inhibitory control are associated with 
overall impulsiveness and, more specifically, motor impulsiveness. However, they differ in that 
working memory capacity correlates with non-planning impulsiveness but not attentional, and 
vice versa for inhibitory control. These results also align with Barrett and colleagues’ proposal 
(2003) that variability within self-regulatory behaviors of individuals is an outcome of 
participants’ ability to override the automatic, habit driven processing by using executive 
function resources. Relevant to the present study, variability in impulsive consumer behavior can 
be accounted for by an individual’s executive function abilities, and, as Barratt and colleagues 
suggested, those resources are working memory capacity and inhibitory control.  
Thus, the results from Study 2 replicate findings from Study 1 and provide some additional 
evidence that the self-report measures of EFI Organization and EFI Impulse Control and the 
executive function tasks of working memory and perhaps inhibitory control (while not 
correlating strongly) reflect some common behaviors and cognitive processing, and other 
subscales of the EFI reflect cognitive flexibility and/or personality traits. Furthermore, the 
measures of EFI Organization and impulse control also demonstrate relations with impulsive 
consumer behavior similarly but not as strongly as the behavioral cognitive assessments of 
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working memory and inhibitory control. It is interesting to note that, as in Study 1, of the two 
types of impulsivity, Impulse Action was found to be significantly related with inhibitory 
control, with differences in working memory capacity also approaching the conservative 
threshold for statistical significance.  
Finally, the results indicate that, of the three components in Miyake and Friedman’s (2012) 
model for executive function, working memory was found to be most strongly related to self-
regulation as reflected in consumer behavior. Relevant to the present study, variability in 
impulsive consumer behavior can be accounted for by an individual’s executive function 
resources available at any moment. As Barratt (2004) suggested, and as the findings from this 
study indicate, these resources appear to be working memory, or updating, as in Miyake & 
Friedman’s framework.  
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4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Table 4.1 below summarizes the similarities and differences in findings from the studies 
reported here. This investigation represents a new and unique attempt to identify and to 
understand the relations between cognitive abilities, personality traits, and impulsive consumer 
behavior. The goals of this present investigation were threefold. The first goal was to investigate 
the relationship between executive function as measured by Spinella’s (2004) self-report 
measure (the Executive Function Index) with personality traits and impulsive consumer 
behavior. The second goal was to investigate the relationship between executive function, as 
measured by standard cognitive assessments, with personality and consumer behavior. The final 
goal was to test the validity of the Executive Function Index (Spinella, 2004) for measuring 
Miyake and Friedman’s (2012) Unity/Diversity model of executive function, as measured by 
behavioral assessments. In other words, to understand how the EFI relates to executive function 
measured by cognitive assessments.  
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Table 4.1. Comparison of primary results from Studies 1A, 1B and 2.  
 
Study 1A and Study 1B Study 2 
EFI Impulse Control and EFI Organization were 
correlated with Impulse Action. *** 
EFI Impulse Control, EFI Organization, Working 
Memory and Inhibitory Control were correlated with 
Impulse Action. *** 
 
EFI Impulse control and EFI Organization were 
correlated with individual impulsive consumer 
behavior measures. * 
EFI Impulse Control and EFI Organization were the 
only self-report measures of the EFI that correlated 
with cognitive measures. * 
 
EFI Strategic Planning was correlated with Impulse 
Plan. * 
All EFI measures were more strongly correlated with 
personality measures than cognitive assessments. * 
 
Conscientiousness was correlated with EFI 
Organization and Impulse Action. ** 
Conscientiousness was correlated with EFI Strategic 
Planning and Impulse Plan. ** 
 
EFI Motivational Drive was correlated with both 
Openness and Extroversion. *** 
EFI Motivational Drive was correlated with both 
Openness and Extroversion. *** 
 
EFI Organization and EFI Impulse Control extreme 
groups demonstrate differences in consumer behavior. 
People who scored lowest in EFI ORG and EFI IC 
reported significantly more impulsive consumer 
behavior than people with high scores. *** 
 
Working Memory tasks and EFI Organization high and 
low groups demonstrate similar differences in 
consumer behavior. Differences replicate findings in 
Study One. *** 
 EFI Impulse Control extreme groups demonstrated no 
significant differences in consumer behavior. ** 
 
Impulse Action, but not Impulse Plan, extreme groups 
significantly differ in consumer behavior, with high 
Impulse Action group showing high impulse consumer 
behavior. *** 
 
Impulse Action, but not Impulse Plan, high/low groups 
demonstrate differences in consumer behavior, and 
replicated findings in study one. *** 
 Both Working Memory and Inhibitory control high/low 
groups demonstrated differences in Impulse Action but 
not Impulse Plan. ** 
 
Conscientiousness extreme groups demonstrate 
differences in consumer behavior. ** 
Conscientiousness nor any other personality measures, 
high/low groups showed no differences in consumer 
behavior. ** 
 
Note: *** reflects findings that replicated across studies; ** indicates failures to replicate; * indicates 
results that are unique to one study. 
 
The first question asked in this dissertation was, “What is the relation between 
personality, impulsive consumer behavior, and executive function, as measured by the Executive 
Function Index, a self-report measure?” Findings from these studies offer the following answers 
to this question. First, of the Executive Function Index subscales, the EFI Organization appears 
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to be most related to impulsive consumer behavior. Higher EFI Organization scores were 
associated with lower spending behavior, lower financial risk taking, lower credit-card misuse, 
and opportunity seeking, and with higher value seeking in Study 1. Similarly, extreme groups 
formed on the basis of EFI Organization score differed significantly in consumer behavior. 
Additionally, EFI Impulse Control appeared to be related to consumer behavior in lower 
spending, financial risk taking, credit card misuse, and opportunity seeking, and higher value 
seeking in Study 1. The EFI Organization subscale was also found to be related to impulsive 
consumer behavior, as evidenced by the Purchasing Task in Study 2. Individuals who were 
higher in EFI Organization in Study 2 demonstrated less impulsive consumer behavior in the 
purchasing task by purchasing less times and spending less money. These results suggest that the 
EFI Organization and Impulse Control subscales, as measures of executive function, indicate 
executive function as having a role in consumer behavior. The fact that Impulse Control is not 
related to the measures of consumer behavior in Study 2 may be understood by the specific items 
in the measure. The items for EFI Organization focus on remembering, maintaining, and 
updating a sequence, monitoring, not losing track of a process, etc.; whereas the items for 
Impulse Control focused more on control of inappropriate behaviors (i.e., sexual advances). 
Thus, the Study 2 Purchasing task could reflect more of the behaviors measured in the EFI 
Organization items than in EFI Impulse Control. This impact appears to replicate previous 
studies that suggest better executive function informs consumer decision making through self-
regulation supported by updating and monitoring. In addition, the same two subscales are also 
related to a type of impulsivity (Impulse Action) that is itself associated with impulsive 
consumer behavior whereas personality measures, namely conscientiousness, was related to 
Impulse Plan, a type of impulsivity not associated to consumer behavior.  
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The only relationship identified between personality and consumer behavior is the 
high/low groups differences in Conscientiousness in consumer behavior in Study 1A and Study 
1B. The relationship between Conscientiousness and consumer behavior was not replicated in 
Study 2. No additional findings from this study suggested relations between personality 
measures and impulsive consumer behavior (i.e., correlations were significant, but very small); 
however, personality measures were significantly associated with the Executive Function Index 
subscales (Motivational Drive and Strategic Planning) that were themselves not related to 
consumer behavior. This finding supports Fleming, Heintzelman, and Bartholow’s (2016) 
contention that the personality trait of conscientiousness is associated with mental set-shifting 
but not working memory (updating) or inhibitory control. The results, finding a relationship 
between conscientiousness and consumer behavior in Study 1A and Study 1B but not in Study 2, 
in addition to Fleming, et. al.’s (2016) finding, bolster the prediction that measures of cognitive 
flexibility are not associated with consumer behavior. It is interesting that the present findings 
from Study 2 were consistent with that prediction in that cognitive flexibility did not demonstrate 
any relationship with consumer behavior.  
Thus, for the first goal, this study suggests that two subscales of the EFI, Organization 
and Impulse Control, have some relationship with consumer behavior, and that the other 
subscales of the EFI are more closely related to personality, as the other subscales show no 
relationship to consumer behavior.  
For the second goal, the question was asked, “What is the relation between standard 
cognitive or behavioral assessments of executive function, personality, and consumer behavior? 
The findings from an investigation into the relationship between working memory and 
impulsivity provided some preliminary insight and support (albeit certainly not conclusive) for 
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Hinson, Witney, and Jameson’s (2003) claim that impulsivity is mainly an adaptive behavior for 
low working memory, and trait impulsivity can be largely accounted for by individual 
differences in working memory capacity.  
According to Friedman and Miyake (2017), common EF is representing, implementing, 
and maintaining goals. However, Engle (2018) and others have concluded that working memory 
capacity is also goal maintenance through controlled attention, as opposed to updating and 
integrating of information as measured by Nback and Corsi, used in this study. Thus, for this 
study, goals regarding financial health must be attended to, and working memory would be used 
for updating and integrating information, in addition to monitoring current financial state as it 
pertains to the goal of financial health. The ambiguous role of inhibitory control in this study, as 
associated with Impulse Action but not consumer behaviors, may actually offer support to this 
perspective of Common EF as inhibitory control for maintenance of goals. Inhibitory control can 
be seen as framework or scaffolding in which goals are perpetually secured regardless of 
incorporation or updating of new information. In Study 2’s Purchasing Task, long term goal 
maintenance was not necessary for a hypothetical purchasing task. Within the context of Study 2, 
goals for the tasks as well as the survey purchasing outcomes would be to act in a financially 
responsible manner, particularly to remain within a budget and not spend money beyond their 
budget, but there were minimal to no distractions of classically-conditioned advertisements or 
other long-term distractions that compete for one’s attention in daily life. There were also no 
significant consequences for not maintaining their goals, and for some individuals, the goal that 
was being represented and maintained most likely would have been to finish the task as soon as 
possible to receive their payment. Therefore, in this study, it is evident that executive function, as 
defined and modeled by Friedman and Miyake’s (2017) current model, informs consumer 
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behavior. First, Common EF, or goal maintenance provides a backdrop matrix of goal-related 
information by which an individual then updates and monitors information against to evaluate 
the potential consequences of an action. The matrix of inhibition could possible bias perception 
to help maintain ongoing goals, and at a minimum make choices about what to buy and when to 
buy it easier. Working memory would update current state, but the decision at hand would be 
viewed through the lens of goal maintenance (i.e., what the participant was instructed to or trying 
to accomplish). For this current study, however, the purchasing task did not require goal 
maintenance in consumer decision making; that is, participants were not required to keep track of 
expenditures or to remain within a fixed budget. Thus, executive function component with the 
strongest relation to purchasing behavior was found to be working memory (mental updating) 
rather than inhibition (controlled attention to inhibit prepotent tendencies to spend in ways 
antithetical to the participant’s goals).  
Witney, Jameson, and Hinson (2003) demonstrated differences in relations between types 
of impulsivity and working memory capacity and inhibition. Although factor analysis determined 
two subtypes of impulsivity in this study, as opposed to the three subtypes listed in Witney, et 
al.’s work, the current findings substantiate the Witney and collaborators’ results that types of 
impulsivity do, in fact, relate to some of Miyake and Friedman’s factors of executive function. 
Like Witney, et al.’s findings, the present study suggested that inhibitory control is related to 
motor impulsivity, as reflected in an impulse action measure. However, unlike Witney, et. al.’s 
findings, no factors of executive function (working memory, inhibitory control, or cognitive 
flexibility) were related to Impulse Plan in this study. Rather, only the personality trait of 
conscientiousness demonstrated a strong relation with Impulse Plan.  
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There was no significant relationship between Inhibitory Control (as measured by 
behavioral measures of Stroop, Stop Signal and Go/No-Go, and defined as inhibiting responses 
to nonrelevant stimuli) and Impulse Control (as measured by EFI IC, with items referencing 
inhibition of inappropriate behavior) or impulsive consumer behavior (defined in Study 2 as 
more purchases and more money spent). In fact, the stronger of these relationships identified in 
the current study was between Inhibitory Control and Impulse Action (as measured by BIS-8, 
with items referencing motor control). These results suggest that the measures of Inhibitory 
Control and Impulse Control do not reflect the same cognitive processes, despite the similarity of 
their names and what would seem to be overlap in their meanings (i.e., stopping responses to 
irrelevant or unfavorable stimuli). However, the present results provide little insight into what 
these indices actually measure, and which seems most likely to be useful in understanding the 
role of inhibitory control in consumer behavior.  
The results for this study reflect Barratt’s (2004) proposal that working memory capacity 
contributes to self-regulation within the dual-process model. Barratt discussed three mechanisms 
through which individual differences in controlled attention manifest in variations of self-control. 
First, working memory capacity is associated with tolerance of ambiguity. Tolerance of 
ambiguity would reflect the ability to monitor and simultaneously hold conflicting information. 
Barratt (2001) also suggested that uncertainty places cognitive load on an individual, thus 
making correct evaluation of future choice while holding or maintaining evaluation of the 
immediate option more difficult. Individuals with high capacity for working memory would 
therefore be at an advantage over low WMC individuals in resolving ambiguous and uncertain 
situations. Within the present study, one may question whether the requirement to monitor and 
update amounts of purchase creates ambiguity and uncertainty for the individual. If he or she is 
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unable to predict (as they were) how many purchasing questions, in what order, or what the 
potential outcome of the purchasing task would be (e.g., if there were real-world consequence to 
responses in the purchasing task), the participant could be cognitively loaded. In addition, the 
time limit of one hour for Study 2 could load a participant as well. This cognitive load would 
certainly affect outcomes of individuals with high versus low working memory, as Barratt 
suggested.  
Second, Barratt (2001) argued that working memory capacity assists an individual’s 
ability to resist attentional capture and thus allows the person to maintain goal-oriented control. 
Within this dissertation, individuals with the ability to maintain the budget and monitor and 
update how closely their running purchases amounted to that total were the individuals who 
scored higher in working memory. This is evidenced by the significant differences in the high 
and low working memory group comparisons on purchasing behavior.  
Third, Barratt suggested that working memory capacity may influence an individual’s 
ability to suppress classically-conditioned affective associations not relevant or optimal at that 
time. The present study does not directly support or negate this claim. However, within the two 
survey studies, individuals with high scores in the EFI Organization and EFI Impulse Control 
subscales demonstrated real-life decisions that would include resisting attractive advertisement 
and attractive get-rich-quick opportunities by scoring lower in spending behavior and 
opportunity seeking, and higher in control over risky financial behaviors, as well as overall 
impulsive consumer behavior. Although this study does not directly test the validity of Barratt’s 
claim, the outcomes do rely on overriding impulses and resisting attractive advertisement. 
Therefore, the differences between high and low executive function groups in the measured 
outcomes may substantiate Barratt’s claim.  
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Regarding Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, and Schmit’s (2008) claim that 
working memory capacity moderates the relation between automatic and controlled precursors 
and behaviors, the current study offers support. In particular, the second study demonstrates 
individuals with higher working memory were less likely to purchase impulsively or to extend 
beyond their stated budget. Hofmann et. al. could explain this result by suggesting that 
individuals with lower working memory capacity were more inclined to succumb to automatic 
impulses, such as the emotional appeal of getting the newer, bigger, and fancier option, of 
purchase.  
For the third goal, the question was asked, “How does the Executive Function Index 
relate to Executive Function, as measured by traditional cognitive assessments. With regard to 
the Executive Function Index (EFI) and its validity, the results suggest that some subscales of the 
EFI do indeed relate, although not strongly, with the behavioral measures known to measure 
cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, and working memory capacity. Two subscales of the EFI 
(Impulse control and Organization) were significantly, but weakly (i.e., accounting for less than 
five percent of the variability), correlated with measures of all three of Miyake and Friedman’s 
(2012) components: updating, cognitive flexibility/shifting, and inhibitory control. However, 
although these two EFI subscales correlated with behavioral assessments of executive function, 
the remaining subscales of the EFI were not significantly related to any cognitive behavioral 
assessments of executive function. The EFI subscales of Motivational Drive, Empathy, and 
Strategic Planning seem not to measure or relate to executive functions found in the three 
cognitive components in the Unity/Diversity model. However, two of these three EFI subscales, 
Motivational Drive and Strategic Planning, did correlate somewhat strongly moderately well 
with personality traits.  
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A potential explanation for the findings is that some (perhaps all, as even Org and IC had 
largest correlations with some of the Big Five, as is discussed below) of Spinella’s EFI were 
more strongly correlated with personality measures instead of executive functions could be 
grounded in findings by Murdock, Oddi, and Bridgett (2013) that some executive functions 
could be significantly related to personality. For example, these authors found working memory 
capacity to be significantly related to neuroticism and to openness. That is, individuals with high 
working memory scores were more open to experience, more extroverted, and less neurotic. 
Whereas findings such as these demonstrate potential relationships between personality and 
executive functions, this current study only found significant correlations between the self-report 
survey results, not the behavioral indicators of executive functioning. Thus, it is just as plausible 
that the relationships could be accounted for by similarity in assessment delivery. That is, 
common method variance may inflate correlations; thus, it may be expected that the measures of 
self-report survey may appear to be more closely related with each other than the behavioral 
measures and survey scales.  
 One can infer that the EFI not only measures executive functions but personality traits as 
well, therefore suggesting either that the EFI is not a valid measure of executive function or that 
executive functions and personality traits overlap. Or it may be inferred that the state of mind or 
state of personality, as personality can have slight fluctuations, the individual is experiencing 
influences self-report measures of anything, including executive function. The more 
parsimonious answer would be the EFI lacks validity as a ‘pure’ measure of executive function, 
as a substantial amount of research would be needed to verify the claim that executive function 
and personality traits could inform or account for each other.  
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Current research does suggest, however, that there is some relation between personality, 
as measured by the Big Five, and cognition. For example, Soubelet & Salthouse (2010) 
identified some strong relations between personality and cognition across life span. In particular, 
higher Openness was positively correlated and associated with four cognitive ability factors: 
fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, episodic memory, and perceptual speed. They also 
found that higher Extraversion was associated with lower levels of fluid and crystalized 
intelligence. Unsworth, et. al. (2009) found Neuroticism was weakly and negatively related to 
fluid intelligence; however, Openness was not related to fluid intelligence, nor were 
Agreeableness nor Conscientiousness related to any measures of executive functions (Flanker, 
Ospan, Antisaccade, Raven, Letter fluency). Buchanan (2016) tested for correlations between 
personality measures, self-report executive function (Webexe; Buchanan, 2010), and standard 
cognitive assessments (Trail-Making, Digit Span, and Semantic Fluency). Buchanan identified in 
three studies some strong relationships between self-reported executive dysfunction or problems 
and Neuroticism and low Conscientiousness, with moderate to strong effects. However, 
Openness was not related to any measures of executive function. Thus, existing results regarding 
the relationship between personality and executive function are somewhat inconsistent. The 
current literature is inadequate to make claims, and additional research is needed.  
In this current study, some relations between personality and self-report measures of 
executive function were similarly identified, although the majority of these correlations were 
weak to moderate. In particular, Motivational Drive was related to Extraversion and Openness, 
and Strategic planning was related to Conscientiousness. What is most interesting, however, is 
that the relationships were found with executive function self- report measures not correlated 
with standard cognitive assessments. Thus, the conclusion may possibly follow that the subscales 
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of the EFI Motivational Drive and Strategic Planning failed to measure executive function, and 
thus that there are no executive functions truly measured with the EFI. Rather, it appears that the 
EFI measures one’s attitudes or beliefs about one’s executive functions.  
The result from Study 2 indicated the following: Only the EFI subscales of organization 
and impulse control demonstrated relations with standard cognitive assessments that were 
selected to reflect components within Miyake and Friedman’s (2012) model. In particular, these 
two subscales seemed to be most related to working memory (updating) and maybe inhibitory 
control (common EF), albeit to a lesser degree. For example, EFI Organization items included 
references to consolidation and updating information and maintaining a sequence of information 
whereas EFI Impulse Control items reflected real-world impulsivity like inappropriate sexual 
advances and swearing. These items, of all the EFI agreement statements, are most likely to 
reflect behavior associated with working memory and impulse control. The remaining subscales 
of the EFI were not related to cognitive assessments of Miyake and Friedman’s Unity/Diversity 
Model but rather measures of personality. In addition, working memory and the Executive 
Function Index subscale of organization demonstrated overlap in the relation with consumer 
behavior, with working memory demonstrating stronger effects. These findings challenge 
Spinella’s (2004) claim that all of the factors in his index, Strategic Planning, Organization, 
Motivational Drive, Empathy, and Impulse Control, measure factors of executive function, and 
should be related to cognitive assessments of executive function. Also, these findings challenge 
Spinella’s assertion that the correlation of the Executive Function Index to other self-report 
measures previously validated with behavioral measures validate the EFI. Although the relations 
observed here between EFI subscales and standard cognitive behavioral tasks were not strong, 
the two subscales of Impulse Control and Organization did indicate some relationship with 
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executive function, as well as with impulsive consumer behavior. In particular, the two subscales 
of Impulse Control and Organization replicated the same relationship as working memory and 
impulsive consumer behavior, although more weakly. Thus, the findings of this study suggest the 
EFI needs additional work to become a valid self-report measure of executive function.  
It appears from these studies that only one of the components of Miyake and Friedman’s 
(2012) model, namely working memory, directly informs impulsive consumer behavior. In 
addition, personality is not associated with impulsive consumer behavior, nor does it interact 
with working memory with regards to impulsive consumer behavior. Finally, there is some 
evidence that inhibitory control offers supports or is a type of scaffolding for the effects of 
working memory within impulsive consumer behavior. 
With regards to the EFI and impulsive consumer behavior, both parts of Study 1, with a 
total of over 12,000 participants, revealed a significant relationship between the two EFI 
subscales of Impulse Control and Organization and consumer behavior. Part B of Study One 
replicated findings in Part A that individual differences in Impulse Control and Organization 
were in fact related to impulsive consumer behavior. These two subscales were also the only 
subscales significantly related to behavioral measures of executive function. A strong inference 
may thus be made that executive function, as measured by two subscales of the Executive 
Function Index, is indeed related to impulsivity within consumer behavior. However, in Study 2, 
EFI Organization was the only subscale to be related to consumer behavior. Also, the relations 
between personality measures and EFI subscales were stronger than the relations between EFI 
subscales and behavioral measures of executive function. In addition, of the behavioral measures 
for components of executive function, working memory was found to demonstrate an association 
with consumer behavior. Thus, a potential inference from these studies may be that EFI 
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Organization measures (or perhaps requires) working memory. This inference would explain 
why groups formed on the basis of high/low working memory (Nback and Corsi) and EFI 
Organization similarly differed significantly on measures of consumer behavior.  
In conclusion, this study confirms that executive function plays a role within consumer 
decision making and consumer behavior. In both studies, executive function, as measured first by 
a self-report measure and then secondly by standard cognitive assessments, was inversely related 
with impulsive consumer behavior. Specifically, working memory demonstrated the strongest 
relationship with impulsive consumer behavior.  
One limitation of this project would be the need to parse out individuals in the second 
study who did not engage and respond honestly during the study. Because the methodology of 
this study was an online survey, participant engagement could not be monitored. Although the 
number of participants not fully engaged in each task should be minimal in this study, as 
responses from individuals who responded under a specific time (seven minutes) were removed 
from the study, additional insight into participant engagement could be helpful. A recording of 
individual task and question response times would be helpful to understand whether any 
immediate yes/no answers to each individual question simply reflected disengagement (i.e., 
participants just clicking without reading to end the survey sooner).  
A second limitation is the question of reality. The question must arise that individuals 
may respond in a different manner if their real money is at stake. For example, one must question 
whether chronic or acute financial distress could load an individual. This load, per Hinson et. al. 
(2003), could in turn affect consumer behavior by disallowing the individual the opportunity to 
evaluate long-term reward as well as short-term rewards correctly. The purchasing questions 
generated for Study 2 were designed to maximize the participants’ experience of making real-life 
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purchases; nevertheless, it remains to be determined whether the relations observed here would 
generalize to decision-making in a real-life phone purchase, for example. 
In addition, as part the issue with real-world experience, a limitation on Study 2 is the 
failure of necessity for goal maintenance. Participants were asked to name their hypothetical 
budget but were given no instructions or reward for maintaining the budget. Adding instructions 
and an incentive to engage a goal of remaining under budget may offer enough incentive to 
perform goal maintenance, and in doing so, engage common EF in participants.  
To conclude, the study identified working memory as the component of executive 
function that informs purchasing behavior. Higher working memory is associated with consumer 
behavior outcomes associated with self-regulation, such as less spending, more value seeking, 
and staying within a budget. Additionally, this study tested a self-report measure of executive 
function and found that while one subscale was related to some consumer behavior and 
minimally related to behavior measures of working memory, the majority of it to be more closely 
associated with personality.  
To further the findings of this study, additional studies may contain the following: First, a 
follow-up study using methodology that replicates real-life spending scenarios would address the 
question of whether or not hypothetical money is handled differently, thus affecting consumer 
decision making. In this scenario, a participant would receive a specific spending amount, and a 
purchase to be made. Upsells would be given, with the understanding the amount not spent is 
kept for future purchases of their choice. Additionally, with the correct technology, a study in 
which real-world purchase options in real-time on a participants’ phone would address these 
limitations.  
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Second, a follow-up study should address the need for practical means to improve 
consumer decisions. Multiple studies have resulted in negative or inconclusive results for 
Working Memory Capacity training (Shipstead, Redick, Engel, 2010); thus, countering 
impulsive spending with memory training is not suggestable. Rather, training individuals in long-
term goal maintenance may be a successful way to combat impulsive spending. In this model, 
inhibitory control, or common EF should be investigated as a preemptive ability to maintain a 
system of goals in spending choices. In other words, if an individual is trained to preempt a 
choice, by biasing perception of environment or by simply training a habitual negative response 
with qualifications, with a “no” or an agreement of choices to be made for spending, the choice 
for yes is then only considered or contemplated within parameters. This training may then 
minimize the need for larger amounts of working memory resources to evaluate and compare 
smaller/sooner, bigger/later choices, or with load of emotional appeal. The choice is made prior 
to consideration or emotionally appealing information. In this additional study, types of trainings 
may be considered and tested. In particular, asking individuals to journal, pray, or contemplate 
their particular financial goals prior to making a financial choice may be an effective means of 
pre-empting impact of emotional appeal in advertising through time delay. In addition, 
journaling, contemplating, or prayer may also serve as effective means of rehearsal of goals and 
slow down impulsive decision making.  
A third follow-up study should address the Executive Function Index. In particular, 
another study should work to modify the EFI to correlate successfully with cognitive measures of 
executive function. This study should also seek explicitly to test whether the EFI measures 
individual’s beliefs about their executive function rather than EF itself. In other words, a study 
should seek to parse out the influence an individual’s beliefs or perspective of their EF 
86 
performance from actual objective knowledge of personal performance in executive function. It 
is possible, of course, that the EFI accurately captures what participants understand about EF and 
believe with respect to their own strengths and weaknesses, and still for those beliefs to be 
inaccurate (as, for example, when one’s confidence is poorly calibrated to one’s accuracy). In 
this follow-up study to explicate the relation of EFI and personality, additional self-report 
measures that are unrelated to executive function should be included. By examining those 
correlations, we may determine the degree to which the relation between EF and personality 
reflect method variance (e.g., the manifest inter-correlation of all self-report measures) or if it is 
something more meaningful, something that informs the literature about the influence of 
personality on EF, and vice versa.  
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A: Executive Function Index 
Rate how well each of the following statements describes you. 
I have a lot of enthusiasm to do things. MD 
When doing several things in a row, I mix up the sequence. ORG 
I try to plan for the future. SP 
I can sit and do nothing for hours.MD 
I take risks, sometimes for fun. IC 
I have trouble when doing two things at once, multi-tasking. ORG 
I'm interested in doing new things. MD 
I have a lot of concern for the well-being of other people. EMP 
I'm an organized person. ORG 
I save money on a regular basis. SP 
I do or say things that others find embarrassing. IC 
People who are foolish enough to be taken advantage of deserve it. EMP 
I only have to make a mistake once in order to learn from it. SP 
I tend to be an energetic person. MD 
I make inappropriate sexual advances or flirtatious comments. IC 
When someone is in trouble, I feel the need to help them. EMP 
I sometimes I lose track of what I'm doing. ORG 
I feel protective towards a friend who is being treated badly. EMP 
I think about the consequences of an action before I do it. SP 
I lose my temper when I get upset. IC 
I take other people's feelings into account when I do something. EMP 
I have trouble summing up information in order to make a decision with it. ORG 
I start things, but then lose interest and do something else. ORG 
I swear/use obscenities. IC 
I don’t like it if my actions or words hurt someone else. EMP 
I use strategies to remember things. SP 
I monitor myself so that I can catch any mistakes. SP 
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Appendix B: Credit Card Misuse Scale Items 
 
1. I am less concerned with the price of a product when I use a credit card. 
2. I rarely go over my available credit limit. 
3. I always pay off my credit cards at the end of the month. 
4. I am more impulsive when I shop with credit cards. 
5. I have too many credit cards. 
6. I worry how I will pay off my credit card debt. 
7. I seldom take cash advances on my credit cards. 
8. I often make only the minimum payment on my credit card bills. 
9. My credit cards are usually at their maximum credit limit. 
10. I frequently use available credit on one credit card to make a payment on another 
credit card. 
11. I am seldom delinquent in making payments on my credit cards. 
12. I spend more when I use a credit card. 
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Appendix C: Brief Barratt Impulsivity Measure (BIS-8) 
 
How well do the following statements describe your personality? Please select “1” for strongly 
disagree and “5” for strongly agree. [DO NOT RANDOMIZE] 
 
 I see myself as someone who… 
1 I plan tasks carefully. (Plan) 
2 I do things without thinking. (Action) 
3 I don’t “pay attention.” (Action) 
4 I am self-controlled. (Plan) 
5 I concentrate easily. (Plan) 
6 I am a careful thinker (Plan). 
7 I say things without thinking. (Action) 
8 I act on the spur of the moment. (Action). 
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Appendix D: Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a 
number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that 
statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one 
characteristic applies more strongly than the other.  
I see myself as:  
1. _____ Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome.  
3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined.  
4. _____ Anxious, easily upset.  
5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex. 
6. _____ Reserved, quiet.  
7. _____ Sympathetic, warm. 
8. _____ Disorganized, careless.  
9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable.  
10. _____ Conventional, uncreative.  
 
TIPI scale scoring (‘‘R’’ denotes reverse-scored items): Extraversion: 1, 6R; Agreeableness: 2R, 
7; Conscientiousness; 3, 8R; Emotional Stability: 4R, 9; Openness to Experiences: 5, 10R 
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Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1, Part A 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
valueseeking 6122 1.00 7.00 4.5773 1.38420 
spenders 6122 1.00 7.00 3.5939 1.65433 
CCMIsuse 6122 1.00 5.00 2.4078 .81379 
extroversion 6122 1.00 7.00 3.9137 1.34397 
Agreeableness 6122 1.00 7.00 4.8239 1.17276 
consicentiousness 6122 1.00 5.00 3.2560 1.05783 
neuroticism 6122 1.00 7.00 3.4343 1.28605 
Openness 6122 1.00 7.00 4.7821 1.18186 
Impulseaction 6122 1.00 5.00 2.6800 .96624 
Impulseplan 6122 1.00 5.00 2.2714 .80077 
IMPULSE 6122 1.00 5.00 2.4757 .68269 
EXFUNCOVERAL
L 
6122 1.89 4.96 3.4246 .44892 
EXEFMD 6122 1.00 5.00 3.4469 .71629 
EXEFORG 6122 1.00 5.00 3.2260 .92920 
EXEFSP 6122 1.29 5.00 3.4316 .57961 
EXEFIC 6122 1.00 5.00 3.1930 .88420 
EXEFEM 6122 1.00 5.00 3.7600 .70896 
Valid N (listwise) 6122     
 
  
113 
Appendix F: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1, Part A 
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Appendix G: Correlations for Study 1, Part B 
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Appendix H: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1, Part B 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
opportunityseekers 6000 1.00 7.00 1.7868 1.62829 
ccmisuse 6000 1.00 5.00 2.2468 .82632 
financialrisk 6000 2.00 10.00 3.8225 2.24384 
agree2 6000 1.00 7.00 4.9910 1.19809 
neuro2 6000 1.00 7.00 3.3421 1.35766 
open2 6000 1.00 7.00 4.7416 1.19090 
consien2 6000 1.00 7.00 5.4034 1.27782 
EFI 6000 1.41 4.89 3.4963 .45759 
impulseplan 6000 1.00 5.00 2.2203 .76752 
impulseaction 6000 1.00 5.00 2.5141 .98643 
impulsivity 6000 1.00 5.00 2.3672 .69138 
extro2 6000 1.00 7.00 3.7813 1.40603 
execmd 6000 1.00 5.00 3.4266 .74739 
execorg 6000 1.00 5.00 3.3540 .95573 
execsp 6000 1.00 5.00 3.4441 .57993 
execic 6000 1.00 5.00 3.4075 .93164 
execem 6000 1.00 5.00 3.7962 .68400 
Valid N (listwise) 6000     
 
 
  
116 
Appendix I: Correlations for Study 1, Part B 
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Appendix J: Correlations for Study 1, Part B 
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Appendix K: Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 
Behavioral Measures N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
corsispan_mean 253 .000 5.700 3.922 1.082 
Stroop differencescore 252 -230.228 932.642 120.678 131.713 
taskswitch_mixcost 253 -592.949 1767.104 227.624 248.148 
taskswitch_switchcost 253 -615.622 1342.712 320.288 528.154 
gambling 253 .000 .930 .469 .218 
gonogo_go_rt (ms) 253 186.157 985.000 417.209 82.726 
gonogo_nogo_errorrate 253 .0 1.0 .136 .178 
stopsignal_errorrate 253 .660 1.000 .856 .076 
wisconsin_preservationerror 253 .066 .400 .154 .070 
nbackmiss 251 .00 1.00 .319 .257 
nbackfalspos 253 .00 .54 .128 .098 
nbacktotal 252 .00 1.88 .4710 .360 
Valid N (listwise) 250     
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Appendix L: Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Self-Report Measures 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Impulsivity 253 1 49 15.05 8.348 
Credit card 253 .00 7.00 3.2451 1.13574 
Motivational drive 253 1.75 7.00 4.7717 1.24285 
Strategic planning 253 2.29 7.00 5.3027 .93255 
Impulse control 253 1.25 7.00 4.5494 1.24105 
Organization 253 .00 7.00 4.4964 1.33685 
Credit card misuse 253 .00 5.91 2.8383 1.32323 
Impulse plan 253 .00 25.00 5.9605 4.36236 
Impulse action 253 1.00 27.00 9.0909 4.92600 
extraversion 253 .5 6.5 3.008 1.8225 
agreeableness 253 .0 7.0 4.891 1.4251 
conscientiousness 253 1.5 7.0 5.170 1.2913 
Emotionally stable 253 .0 7.0 4.488 1.6985 
openness 253 .5 7.0 4.494 1.4124 
Valid N (listwise) 253     
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Appendix M: Purchasing Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
purchasing.1 253 200 1000 315.55 131.125 
purchasing2.1 253 1 2 1.33 .470 
purchasing3.1 253 1 2 1.65 .478 
purchasing4cruise.1 253 1 2 1.52 .501 
purchasing6.1 253 1 2 1.70 .459 
purchasing4b.1 253 1 2 1.87 .342 
purchasing7.1 253 1 2 1.67 .470 
purchasing8.1 253 1 2 1.77 .421 
purchasing9.1 253 1 2 1.60 .490 
buy9b.1 253 1 2 1.82 .386 
purchasing11.1 253 1 2 1.91 .282 
buy10.1 253 1 2 1.91 .282 
purchasing12.1 252 0 1400 410.32 197.512 
purchasing13.1 253 1 2 1.86 .350 
purchasediff 253 -1750.00 498.00 -132.3518 219.54764 
purchasebudget 253 -1800.00 350.00 -95.6877 302.22527 
purchaseyesno 253 13.00 26.00 22.6087 2.99223 
Valid N (listwise) 252     
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Appendix N: Correlations for Study 2 
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Appendix O: Study 2 Correlations between EFI and Personality Measures 
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Appendix P: Study 2 EFI and Cognitive Flexibility Correlations 
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Appendix Q: Study 2 Correlations of Inhibitory Control Behavioral Measures and EFI 
Subscales 
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Appendix R: Study 2 Correlations of Working Memory Behavioral Measures and EFI 
Subscales 
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Appendix S: Correlations Study 2 Correlations of Working Memory Behavioral Measures 
and EFI Subscales 
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Appendix T: Partial Correlations of Personality Measures and EFI Subscales  
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Appendix U: Purchasing Task Questions and Order of Behavioral Tasks 
 
Age 
Purchasing Q1: Your only mobile device has been damaged and needs to be replaced. You have 
$1000 in savings to spend, but have other ideas for that money as well, including taking a 
vacation, saving for the holidays, supporting a charitable cause, and maintaining an emergency 
fund in savings. You can get a refurbished device that has all the functional features for $200 
(minimum memory, adequate screen size, satisfactory function). However, it is a basic model. 
You can purchase upgrades (and will be allowed to do so later in this survey). What is the most 
from your $1000 would you be willing to spend on such a device, including those additional 
upgrades? 
-{min=200,max=1000} 
Gender 
Stopsignal 
Purchasing Q2: Instead of getting a refurbished mobile device, you can get a brand new device 
for only $200 more. Would you like to do that? 
Go/nogo 
Ethnicity 
Purchasing Q3: You can purchase a waterproof, shatterproof case to protect your mobile device 
for an additional $75? Would you like to do so? 
- yes 
- no 
Purchasing Q4 Cruise: You just received an offer for a five night all inclusive Caribbean cruise 
for just $300. Would you like to purchase this opportunity with your leftover savings? 
TIPI Personality 
Wisconsin Card Sort 
Purchasing Q5: Regarding the mobile device mentioned earlier, adding memory allows you to 
download more apps, stream more movies, and store more pictures, videos and music. Would 
you be willing to pay an additional $150 for 50% more memory?  
Nback 1 
Purchasing Q5d: There is a special now for purchasing additional memory. You can buy 50% 
more memory for just $75 now. Would you like to do so? 
Nback 2 
Barratt Impulsiveness 8 
Purchasing Q6: You can increase photo resolution and add a zoom feature to the camera on your 
mobile device for $30. Would you like to purchase this  
TaskSwitching 
Purchasing Q6b: About the mobile device mentioned earlier, the smallest screen is sometimes 
difficult to read or to watch videos. For $80 more, you could upgrade to a newer version with 
double the screen size. Would you want to have a larger mobile device for that amount of 
money? 
Stroop 
Purchasing Q7: Would you like new bluetooth headphones to go with your mobile device for an 
additional $75? 
CORSI 
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Purchasing Q8: The current mobile device you have chosen comes with the most basic battery. 
For an additional $50, you can upgrade the battery, allowing for ongoing usage without charge 
for 48 hours. Would you like to purchase the battery upgrade? 
CORSI 2 
Purchasing Q9: The mobile device that you have chosen previously only comes in an obnoxious 
lime green color for the price. Would you choose to pay an additional $50 for the color of your 
choice?  
Iowa Gambling 
Purchasing Q10: A charger (with adapters for car and computer) is not included with your 
mobile device. Would you like to add that on for $50? 
Purchasing Q11: Currently, your mobile device comes with no policy for replacement if 
damaged. You may add a plan that replaces your phone whenever it is damaged, no questions 
asked, to your purchase for an additional $150 one-time fee. Would you like to do so? 
Purchasing Q12: Phone security continues to be a concern, as the world becomes increasingly 
more digital. You can upgrade your mobile device to the Maximum Security Subscription for a 
flat fee of $150. Would you like to do that? 
Purchasing Q13: You may select a service plan for your mobile device. For a one-time fee of 
$175, you receive a year of unlimited one-on-one time with tech support from the mobile device 
company. In addition, you do not have to set up an appointment and there will never be a wait 
for this service. Would you like to purchase that plan? 
Purchasing Q14: Just to be clear, can you tell me how much you have agreed to spend on your 
mobile device up to this point? 
Purchasing Q15: The provider of the mobile device discussed previously now has an offer for a 
second, larger electronic tablet to go with your mobile device for only $250 more. Would you 
want to accept that offer? 
Credit Card Misuse 
Purchasing Q15: What is the total you have spent on the mobile device? 
Purchasing Q16: What was the original amount you budgeted for your mobile device plus 
upgrades? 
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Appendix V: Study 1A, Means of Quartile Split Extreme Groups 
 
 Impulsive Purchasing 
Behavior 
Mean Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Organization Low 3.843 .022 3.800 3.886 
Low Medium 3.574 .022 3.530 3.617 
Medium 3.435 .058 3.320 3.549 
High 2.565 .022 2.522 2.607 
Impulse Control Low 3.945 .020 3.906 3.985 
Low Medium 3.693 .020 3.654 3.733 
Medium 3.336 .053 3.231 3.440 
High 2.542 .020 2.503 2.581 
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Appendix W: Study 1B, Means of Quartile Split Extreme Groups 
 
 Impulsive Purchasing 
Behavior 
Mean Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Organization Low 3.092 .010 2.073 2.111 
Low Medium 2.056 .010 2.037 2.075 
Medium 1.999 .010 1.980 2.018 
High 1.742 .010 1.723 1.760 
Impulse Control Low 3.107 .010 2.088 2.125 
Low Medium 2.046 .010 2.027 2.065 
Medium 1.983 .010 1.964 2.002 
High 1.728 .009 1.710 1.747 
 
